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4.1  Introduction 
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the authority to regulate commerce 
with foreign nations. Yet, since the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of  1930, Congress 
has been reluctant to impose protection directly, choosing instead to delegate 
that authority to the executive branch. Yet Congress has never given the execu- 
tive unlimited authority to regulate trade; instead, it has allowed the executive 
branch to take specific actions under well-defined circumstances. 
Given Congress’ preference for indirect protection, special interests seeking 
protection must either (1) nudge Congress to legislate conditions which would 
justify protection andor (2) convince the executive that economic conditions 
satisfy previously legislated criteria for protection. Because administered pro- 
tection often gives the executive considerable discretion, an industry seeking 
protection must not only convince the executive that the industry meets the 
criteria set by Congress but that the industry is also “deserving” of protection. 
The action of  the executive is thus as much a political act as is passage by 
Congress of laws that establish administered protection.’ 
J. Michael Finger is a lead economist of the International Trade Division of the International 
Economics Department at the World Bank. Ann Harrison is assistant professor of economics and 
finance at Columbia  University and a faculty research fellow of  the National Bureau of  Eco- 
nomic Research. 
1. We use the word “political” to describe a decision in which the deciding agent has the author- 
ity to determine the criteria by which the decision will be  made. The US. Constitution gives 
Congress the authority to regulate foreign commerce but does not specify criteria that Congress 
must take into account in deciding if or to what degree foreign commerce will be regulated. Con- 
gress’ decisions are therefore by our definition political decisions. In contrast, there are also “tech- 
nical” decisions. A technical decision is one in which the criteria are exogenously specified: the 
deciding agent is charged only to decide if these criteria are met. Antidumping cases exemplify 
technical decisions. In such cases, detailed law and administrative regulations specify the relevant 
criteria and the executive has no discretion to put these criteria aside-its  authority to take action 
(impose an antidumping order) is directly tied to its determination as to whether or not the speci- 
fied criteria are met. 
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In the post-World  War I1 era, the U.S. textile industry achieved a degree of 
protection unparalleled in the rest of the manufacturing sector. Its success is 
evident from the fact that it was the only industry for which the U.S.  govern- 
ment negotiated a multilateral arrangement for quotas within the framework of 
the  General Agreement  on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). But  the  international 
arrangements that were negotiated  did not establish limits on U.S. imports; 
those limits were imposed through administrative actions. The authority of the 
executive to take  these actions rested  on the  legislation  passed  by  the U.S. 
Congress, not on international agreements such as the Multi-Fiber Arrange- 
ment (MFA). Thus protection for the textile industry was administered protec- 
tion, not directly legislated protection. 
Our focus in this paper is on the administrative  dimensions of  protection. 
Our contention is that the game played within these administrative mechanisms 
was different from the game played in the high-level  politics  of  protection. 
Those interests that opposed protection had a significant influence on which 
sectors within textiles and garments received protection, as well as on the de- 
gree of protection. 
We emphasize the administrative dimension for two reasons:  (1) the more 
visible conflict between  nations  over the international agreements to restrict 
textile  and  apparel  trade  have  been  extensively  and  skillfully  studied,  and 
(2)  overlooking  the  administrative  dimension  of  how protection  was put in 
place leads one to overlook one of the most powerful actors in the story-the 
state itself. In determining the scope and magnitude of protection to U.S.  tex- 
tile and garment interests, the U.S.  government was much more than a neutral 
intermediary. It was one of the most influential players in the game. 
We  begin  our analysis with a review  in section 4.2 of political  economy 
models of protection. We go on to apply these models to analyze (1) how the 
textile and apparel industries won the creation of the MFA system of protection 
(sections 4.3 to 4.5) and (2)  how, within this system, quotas were determined 
on  individual  products  imported from different countries  (sections 4.6  and 
4.7). In the final section we evaluate the most important influences on protec- 
tion in the textile and garment industries. 
4.2  Political Economy Models of Protection 
Theoretical models on the political economy of protection (see, e.g., discus- 
sions by  Baldwin  1985 and Trefler  1993) provide a useful  starting point for 
our analysis, 
4.2.1  Effective Organization 
Many theories emphasize that in a representative  democracy, where there 
are costs to participation as well as information costs, those who gain most 
from protection will organize into political pressure groups. Success, in turn, 
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rider problem. Although only some voters or business groups provide resources 
to support lobbying, all the members of a particular sector are likely to gain. 
This  suggests that-other  factors constant-sectors  with  fewer numbers of 
workers and more concentrated production structures will lobby more effec- 
tively for protection. Activities with fewer and larger producing units and pro- 
tected from entry by significant barriers to entry would be expected to be more 
effective in winning protection. 
4.2.2  Value of the Political Payoff 
Other theories, such as the “adding machine” model formulated by  Caves 
(1976), focus instead on the behavior  of politicians who seek to maximize 
their election prospects. The adding machine model suggests that protection 
increases with the number of employees in an industry. Empirically, this sug- 
gests that protection rises with the number of voters who earn their living in 
the sector, that is, with the size of  its workforce. The adding machine model 
and the  special interest model described above imply opposite relations be- 
tween the size of a sector’s workforce and its political influence. 
Other theories bring out qualitative dimensions of  the results  of political 
action. Some focus on the likelihood that more disadvantaged sectors of  the 
population are more likely to receive protection. Baldwin (1985) reviews what 
he describes as the “adjustment assistance”  model and the “equity  concern” 
model. In the first case, the government seeks to minimize short-run labor ad- 
justment costs and protects  sectors which are having the most difficulty ad- 
justing. This suggests that low-growth sectors are more likely to be protected. 
In altruism or equity concern models, politicians want low-income workers 
(i.e., those with lower wage rates) to be protected from trade policy changes. 
Caves also suggests that protection is more likely in sectors with many, smaller 
plants. Another consideration that will condition the value to a politician  of 
political action to protect a particular sector is the importance to the politician’s 
constituency of that sector. Action  in favor of a sector that provides  a large 
share of constituent jobs is more likely than action in favor of one that provides 
a smaller share. 
The altruism models discussed above suggest that factors other than the im- 
mediate self-interest of the decision makers influence the degree of protection 
a sector will receive.2 The following paragraphs summarize other models that 
likewise take into account influences other than the immediate economic inter- 
ests of the sector in question. 
4.2.3 
The relationship between the United States and the exporting country might 
also influence a decision to protect or not to protect a particular sector. (See, 
Power and Influence of the Exporting Countries 
2. These models are grouped as they are because they point to characteristics of the sector itself 
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e.g., Helleiner 1977 for a lengthier discussion of such considerations.) In the 
context of a bargaining framework, the United States is most likely to impose 
trade  restraints  on  countries  whose  retaliation  would  be  less  costly  to the 
United States. One implication is that the United States would be more likely 
to protect products where  the  majority  of imports are received  from small 
countries or  countries that import little from the United  state^.^ More general 
foreign policy considerations point to historically established relationships and 
the strategic interests of  the United States, for example, the location of U.S. 
military bases. 
The attraction of the U.S.  government in recent years to policy instruments 
such as “Super 301”  suggest that the perceived commercial  fairness of the 
exporting countries might also be a determinant of which US. sectors are pro- 
tected. For example, the perception that Japan has evaded its GATT responsi- 
bilities and has maintained high trade barriers in Japan is likely to lead to re- 
strictive U.S. actions against Japanese exports, despite the fact that Japan is a 
large country and receives a large volume of U.S. exports. 
On the other hand, equity concerns could apply as well, particularly if such 
concerns overlap with U.S. strategic interests. Special programs for U.S.  allies, 
such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative, have been introduced to allow poorer 
countries access to the U.S. market that their bargaining power or strategic 
worth would not predict. 
4.2.4  Power of the State 
With administered protection, the outcome on protection is likely to be dif- 
ferent from a direct vote, special interest model. Congress creates administered 
protection mechanisms because these mechanisms insulate the state from spe- 
cial interests?  Particularly  in the early years of  administered protection, the 
executive enjoyed considerable discretion even when the criteria for protection 
were met. This discretionary authority allowed a considerable discrepancy be- 
tween constituent pressures and the resulting protection. The Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act (RTAA) of  1934 was a particularly  important change in the 
mechanics of protection. The discretion granted the executive in other mecha- 
nisms could frustrate constituent pressures for increased protection. The RTAA 
3.  The recent debate over extending China’s textile quotas for export to the U.S. market provides 
an  excellent illustration of the bargaining model. The US.  government stated that it was only 
willing to grant China more generous quota levels in textiles and apparel in exchange for increased 
access to the Chinese market. 
4.  That the power to make individual decisions on protection rests with the state does not sug- 
gest that state enjoyed autocratic power. Administered protection mechanisms are created through 
a democratic process. They have been described by I. M. Destler as providing protection for Con- 
gress from constituents, but there is no suggestion in this that constituents were somehow duped. 
Administered protection could likewise be described as providing protection for constituents from 
constituents-from  the prisoner’s dilemma of  any individual sector being better off with protec- 
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served not only to thwart industry-specific pressures for protection but to cre- 
ate momentum for reducing protection. 
4.3  The 1930s: Protection 
The Smoot-Hawley Tariff was passed in 1930. The reaction of  other coun- 
tries to the Smoot-Hawley Act, combined with the worldwide economic de- 
pression, made it politically impossible that Congress would vote additional 
protection. But there remained administrative  mechanisms through which such 
action might be encouraged. Section 336 of the Smoot-Hawley Act provided 
one such avenue, the trade section of  the National Industrial Recovery Act 
provided another. Passage in  1934 of  the RTAA provided a means by  which 
the president could negotiate down U.S. tariff rates, but its provisions could 
not be used to gain an increase in protection. 
4.3.1  The NIRA and Protection 
One administrative  avenue to protection was provided by the National Indus- 
trial Recovery Act (NIRA), passed in June 1933. This act provided for compa- 
nies in an industry to negotiate and maintain, under government supervision, 
codes of fair competition. In addition to their provisions for maintaining prod- 
uct prices, the codes set up  specific standards to improve labor conditions, 
specifically (1) setting an industry minimum wage, one substantially above the 
prevailing market rate, (2)  limiting hours of work per week, and (3) improving 
working conditions. The NIRA code established in the textile  industry in- 
cluded the elimination of child labor, defined as employment of persons under 
16 years of age. 
Section 3(e) of  the NIRA recognized the necessity of  preventing foreign 
competition from rendering these codes ineffective. Section 3(e) provided that 
the Tariff Commission, when directed by the president to do so, would investi- 
gate the conditions of  competition resulting from increasing imports. If  the 
commission found that imports were interfering with the operation of a code, 
the commission was to recommend to the president the import restraint- 
either a quota or an additional import fee-that  would eliminate the effects of 
imports on operation of the code. 
The NIRA  had  a short history: the U.S. Supreme Court decision in  the 
Schechter Poultry Case of  May 27, 1935, rendered it practically inoperative. 
After that date the Tariff Commission suspended work on all section 3(e) cases 
under way and never opened another case.5 
The investigations the Tariff  Commission undertook under section 3(e) of 
5. When the Schechter case decision was returned, the Tariff Commission had under way section 
3(e) investigations on horse and mule shoes and on bleached cotton cloth. The president had di- 
rected an investigation on cotton and linen netting, but the Tariff Commission had not begun to 
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Table 4.1  Tariff Commission Investigations under Section 3(e) of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act, and Outcomes 
Article  Policy Outcome 
Wood-cased lead pencils 
Quicksilver 
Wool felt hat bodies 
Matches 
Cotton chenille rugs 
Hit-and-miss-rag rugs 
Imitation oriental rugs 
Other rugs 
Red cedar shingles 
Braided hat bodies in 
part of synthetic 
textile 
Affirmative. VER with Japan. 
The Tariff Commission found no section 3(e) grounds for relief. 
The Tariff Commission found no section 3(e) grounds for relief. 
Affirmative. Congress imposed an additional excise tax on the type 
Affirmative. An import fee (in addition to existing customs duties) 
Affirmative. VER with Japan. 
Affirmative. An import fee (in addition to existing customs duties) 
Affirmative. An import fee (in addition to existing customs duties) 
Affirmative. VER with Canada. 
of matches imported. 
was imposed. Also, VER with Japan. 
was imposed. 
was imposed. Also, VER with Japan. 
The Tariff Commission found no section 3(e) grounds for relief. 
Source: U.S. Tariff Commission, Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1933, 1934, 1935). 
the NIRA are listed in table 4.1. Of the 10 completed investigations, seven led 
to import controls, including five voluntary export restraints (VERs). Of the 
five VERs, four were with Japan. 
Each of the investigations involving Japan displayed two common character- 
istics: (1) there was large difference between the price of imports from Japan 
versus imports from other sources, and (2)  Japan had quickly become the dom- 
inant supplier of imports of the article, often the dominant supplier of the ar- 
ticle in  the U.S. market. In the lead pencils case, for example, imports had 
been coming primarily from Germany and Czechoslovakia. In 1933, Japan be- 
came the main source, supplying 70 percent of U.S. imports. Japanese prices 
far undercut the other exporters: Japan, $0.23 per gross; Germany, $4 per gross; 
and  Czechoslovakia,  $3  per  gross  (U.S. International  Trade  Commission 
[USITC] 1934, 42). The cotton chenille rugs investigation found that Japan’s 
share of the U.S. market had gone from 12 percent of domestic consumption 
in  1931 to 80 percent by  December 1933. From the beginning to the end of 
1933, US. domestic production on a monthly basis fell by  85 percent (USITC 
1934,45). 
Each of the cases involving Japanese exports ended with a VER. The four 
rugs cases displayed a pattern of outcome that would become standard for tex- 
tile products: import duties to control imports from Europe, VERs to control 
imports from Japan. Of the four rugs investigations, for example, only the in- 
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rug was imported  almost entirely from Europe: France, Belgium,  and Italy 
(USITC 1934,48). 
Resolution  of  most  of  the NIRA  section  3(e) complaints by  negotiating 
VERs was not an unusual outcome.6 Indeed, the Tariff Commission itself, in 
its 1934 Annual Report pointed out that negotiation of a VER was in the 1930s 
a common form of import relief (USITC 1934,4). 
4.3.2  Section 336 
Section 336 of the Smoot-Hawley Act established a mechanism for adminis- 
trative adjustment of tariff rates. In a section 336 case, the U.S. Tariff Commis- 
sion would conduct an investigation to determine the cost of producing a prod- 
uct in the United States and in exporting countries. Based on that information, 
the Tariff Commission would then recommend to the president the rate change 
that would “equalize competition,” that is, a tariff rate that would make the 
foreign cost plus the tariff equal to the domestic cost. 
Section 336 allowed for applications for tariff reductions as well as for in- 
creases. As table 4.2 shows, one-third of requests for investigations were for 
investigations to support reductions of  tariff^.^ Investigations could begin in 
several ways: by the Tariff Commission’s own motion, by order of the president, 
by request of either house of Congress, or by request of an interested party.* 
The Tariff Commission’s response to these requests reflects both the reluc- 
tance of the executive to increase U.S. tariff rates and the deference it paid to 
Congress on such matters. All of  the 82 requests for “investigation” without 
specification whether the objective was an increase or a reduction of  a tariff 
rate were requested by  Senate resolution, and all of them led to initiation of 
 investigation^.^ But of  the requests for tariff increases, 85 percent were dis- 
missed by  the Tariff Commission without initiation of  an investigation. The 
reluctance of the executive to increase protection is also reflected in the out- 
comes of the investigations that were undertaken. Almost half the time (as table 
4.3 reports), the Tariff Commission recommended no change of the tariff. In 
all, the commission initiated section 336 investigations on 101 products, and 
only 29 of these led to tariff increases. An almost equal number, 25, produced 
a tariff reduction. 
When the RTAA was passed in 1934, negotiations between the United States 
and exporting countries became an alternative means for reducing tariffs. A 
1935 tabulation by the U.S. Tariff Commission lists over 400 reductions of the 
6.  One outcome of the investigation of red cedar shingles imported from Canada was that the 
Canadian industry adopted a code of fair practice similar to the one in place in the U.S. lumber 
industry. Restraint of exports to the United States became a part of that Canadian code. 
7. Most of these were submitted by U.S. importers, but some were from foreign exporters. 
8. The Tariff Commission had almost limitless discretion to determine whether a request from 
9. One investigation was by the Tariff Commission’s own motion, all others were by request of 
an interested party justified initiation of an investigation. 
interested parties. Table 4.2  Applications for Section 336 Investigations, 193141 
Type of Application  Number  Percentage of Total 
Totdl applications received  351 
Action requested 
Tariff increase  145 
Tariff reduction  121 
Investigation  82 
2 
Adjustmentb  1 






Source: Tabulated from U.S. Tariff Commission, Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1931-41). 
"Numbers given are the numbers of tariff lines covered by applications. The total number of appli- 
cations received, strictly speaking  was  297. The Tariff Commission Annual Reports, however, 
provide information on the nature of requests and outcomes only by tariff line. 
"These requests were for shifts from specific to ad valorem rates, the reverse shift, or for changes 
in a compound rate that would move the ad valorem component in one direction and the specific 
component in the other. 
'Less  than 0.5 percent. 




Increaseb  Decrease  No Changec  Total  All Cases 
Textiles 
Apparel 
Chemicals, oils, paints 
Earths, earthenware, glassware 
Metals, metal manufactures 
Wood, wood manufactures 
























2  7  1 
1  5  5 
4  6  6 
5  8  8 
7  16  16 
2  5  5 
0  2  2 
16  30  30 
10  22  22 
41  101  100 
Source; US.  Tariff Commission, Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
193  1-41). 
dNumbers  of outcomes, by tariff line affected. 
bIncludes shifts to American selling price valuation on one agricultural product and on one item 
included in miscellaneous manufactures. 
'In  some of the investigations we have placed in this category, the Tariff Commission determined 
that the present tariff equalized foreign and domestic costs and the president issued a formal proc- 
lamation of no change. In others, the Tariff Commission determined that the domestic product and 
the imported product in question were not comparable, and hence that section 336 did not apply. 
In these instances there was no presidential proclamation. The tabulation reported here includes 
one change (on a chemical product) in which the ad valorem component was increased and the 
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U.S. tariff through reciprocal negotiations. With the availability of this means 
for tariff reductions and the demonstrated reluctance of  the executive to in- 
crease protection through section 336 actions, section 336 was used less and 
less. The Tariff Commission reports no applications for section 336 investiga- 
tions after 194  1. 
4.3.3  Use of These Mechanisms by the Textile and Apparel Industry 
At the time the NIRA was struck down by the Supreme Court, the Tariff 
Commission was conducting a section 3(e) investigation on cotton cloth. This 
investigation was suspended but soon came back in another guise. The se- 
quence of events that led to a voluntary restraint agreement was as follows: 
March 1935: The Senate directed the Tariff Commission to investigate under 
April 1935: The Tariff Commission investigation began. 
October 1935: Negotiation of a VER began between the U.S. and Japanese 
governments. The U.S. State Department requested that the Tariff Commission 
delay submitting its report. 
April 1936: Under industry pressure, the Tariff Commission sent its report 
to the president, recommending a tariff increase. The State Department recom- 
mended that the president delay action. 
section 336. 
May 1936: The president proclaimed a tariff increase of 42 percent. 
August  1936:  Private  direct  negotiations  replaced  government-to- 
January 1937: The Japanese cotton industry agreed to quotas for 1937 and 
government negotiations. 
1938, later extended to cover 1939 and 1940. 
The agreement struck between the U.S. and Japanese industries was quite 
detailed.  Besides specifying export  limits,  the agreement specified how  to 
measure exports and how to handle transshipment from third countries to the 
United States. The memorandum of understanding between the industries also 
established a joint committee of representatives from each country’s industry; 
the function of the committee would be to deal with whatever administrative 
difficulties might arise and to act as a negotiating committee in establishing 
subsequent arrangements between the two industries with regard to future limi- 
tations or other means of control (Bauge 1987,63). 
The quotas were only 64 percent filled over the four years they were in ef- 
fect. Bauge (1987, 66ff.) explains that the U.S. industry had been willing to 
accept a large quota to pin down the Japanese in the future. Also, in  1937, 
Japan declared war on China. The war took an increased share of  Japanese 
output, and Japanese resources were allocated to other industries more directly 
supportive of the war. 
Similar sequences of events led to VERs with Japan on cotton hosiery and 
on velveteen and corduroy. In the agreement on velveteen and corduroy, the 
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lish and send to the president  its report, provided  the Japanese exports re- 
mained within the agreed quota.'" 
4.3.4  Lessons from the 1930s 
Although the US.  textile industry during the 1930s was heavily protected, 
its protection was about average relative to other U.S. industries. The U.S. tex- 
tile industry came into the decade with protection about equal to the average 
for all U.S. industries, and it was no more successful than other industries in 
the 1930s at gaining increased protection. 
The administration of President Franklin Roosevelt  initially  assigned the 
tariff to a domestic policy role, but a secondary one: the tariff was to be used 
to defend the domestic economic policies set out in the NIRA and the Agricul- 
tural Adjustment Act (AAA). After passage of the RTAA,  import protection 
became increasingly a foreign policy  concern of  the executive.  One conse- 
quence was  that  the  executive's  interest  shifted toward  reductions,  not  in- 
creases, in the tariff. As trade policy became more a foreign policy concern, 
the executive turned increasingly to VERs when pressed  to restrict imports. 
Negotiations were the traditional means of conducting foreign policy; hence it 
was only logical that the executive should increasingly use this means for lim- 
iting U.S. imports. 
Both the tying of the tariff to specific domestic policies and its later use as 
a foreign policy tool demonstrates the power of the state to isolate trade policy 
from immediate constituent pressures. This is the primary lesson of the 1930s 
import policy experience. 
4.4  The 1950s: From Ordinary Protection to Exceptional Treatment 
From 1950 to 1962, merchandise imports of textiles and apparel accounted 
for about 3 percent of U.S. consumption, declining from 6 percent at the end 
of the 1930s and 10 percent in the 1920s. In apparel, figure 4.1 (below) shows 
that imports took a smaller share of U.S. consumption than of other industrial 
goods. Clearly, high import volumes on average were not the primary determi- 
nant of protection in the industry. Yet increases in imports tended to be concen- 
trated in specific product lines, which consolidated the opposition. Imports of 
cotton manufactures surged between 1939 and 1958, increasing from 3.4 per- 
cent of domestic production in  1939 to 22 percent in 1958. The import share 
of cotton goods continued to escalate after 1958,  climbing to 36 percent. These 
import surges prompted inflammatory statements against Japanese exports and 
an  occasional  congressional  bill  to impose  quotas  or other  sorts  of  limits 
(Bauge 1987,95). 
10. A detail of this agreement was that cotton velveteen or velvet ribbons would be excluded 
from the categories under restraint. This exclusion was not pressed for by  the Japanese, but rather 
by a Tariff Commission determination that the US.-made and the imported variants of the products 
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4.4.1  Congressional Politics of Trade Policy 
There was little chance that such bills would gain approval, The lessons of 
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff were fresh in mind, and Congress was reluctant to 
encourage direct action. Congress had created several administrative routes to 
protection, discussed below. Through each of these, a specific administrative 
finding gave the president authority to restrict imports but left him with the 
discretionary authority not to do so. There was evolving the political  system 
that I. M. Destler (1992) has called “protection for Congress,” in which a repre- 
sentative under pressure to protect imports could direct a constituent to the 
appropriate administrative mechanism. 
Although the executive’s administration of these mechanisms was designed 
to provide minimal protection,  such mechanisms  sheltered Congress against 
the wrath of special interests who pressured members for import relief. The 
1950s were generally prosperous times during which the United States enjoyed 
substantial trade surpluses. Pointing a protection-seeking industry into a maze 
of administrative procedures bought time. By the time the industry eventually 
emerged from the end of the maze without a prize, business had improved and 
it pressed its case no further. Besides, the system satisfied the American sense 
of fairness. It provided  a place to complain where officials listened, investi- 
gated, and held hearings.  One had  one’s day in  court. To  complain  further 
would be un-American, and maybe even pro-Communist, if the closing of the 
U.S. market tipped a country to the Soviet side in the Cold War. 
GATT solidified  the reciprocal  trade agreements approach as the general 
approach  to tariff  setting, further  minimizing  the  likelihood  that  Congress 
would return to direct tariff making. This further assured that the “ordinary” 
process of tariff making or a direct congressional vote of special protection 
would be difficult avenues to protection. There were, however, other mecha- 
nisms available. 
4.4.2  Presidential Politics of Trade Policy: Trade Policy as Foreign Policy 
There was even less chance that a protectionist bill would avoid a presiden- 
tial veto. While the Congress perceived  trade policy as a means for helping 
local industry, the executive branch of the U.S. government saw trade policy as 
an important instrument of foreign policy.” The ideas that dominated executive 
branch  thinking  are revealed  in the following  two statements from Cordell 
Hull, the first secretary of state to President Franklin Roosevelt and the father 
of the RTAA: 
11. The difference at the time between presidential and congressional trade politics is illustrated 
by  the birth and death of the proposal to create the International Trade Organization (lT0).  The 
proposal to create such an organization and the first draft of a charter came from the US.  govern- 
ment, the executive branch. The IT0 failed to be established in large part because the US.  Con- 
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I felt that all nations should be urged to make their chief rallying point the 
establishment of a state of world order under law, so as to maintain condi- 
tions of permanent peace. (Hull 1948, 173) 
The other statement expresses in a more casual way  the role trade could play 
in establishing peace: 
When I was a boy on the farm in Tennessee, we had two neighbors-I’ll 
call them Jenkins and Jones-who  were enemies of  each other. For many 
years there had been bad feelings between them-I  don’t know why-and 
when they met on the road or in town or at church, they stared at each other 
coldly and didn’t speak. 
Then one of Jenkins’ mules went lame in the spring just when Jenkins 
needed him most for plowing. At the same time Jones ran short of corn for 
his hogs. Now it so happened that Jones was through with his own plowing 
and had a mule to spare, and Jenkins had a bin filled with corn. A friendly 
third party brought the two men together, and Jones let Jenkins use his mule 
in exchange for corn for the hogs. 
As a result, it wasn’t  long before the two old enemies were the best of 
friends. A common-sense trade and ordinary neighborliness had made them 
aware of their economic need of each other and brought them peace. (Hull 
1948,364) 
In addition to the Wilsonian idea of international rule of law and the populist 
idea that trading made good neighbors, the executive’s instinct to trade policy 
was also conditioned by  two decades of process, two decades in which the 
executive had been in an almost continuous negotiation with its trading part- 
ners over trade restrictions. Not just principle but conditioned reflex pushed 
the executive away from unilateral action on trade restrictions. 
4.4.3  Textile Industry Strategy 
The textile industry’s strategy was the obvious one: to maintain pressure on 
all political  fronts and at the  same time  to use all administrative remedies 
available. 
On the political front, through the 1950s the textile industry was active at 
public  hearings concerning  the  U.S. government’s intentions  to cut  tariffs. 
These included not only hearings on proposed negotiating authority but also 
the hearings the trade agreements required on the products on which it might 
negotiate tariff reductions, for example, “peril point” hearings. In 1955, the 
industry  placed  special  focus  on opposing  the  Eisenhower  administration’s 
trade bill that asked for the tariff-cutting authority that eventually allowed U.S. 
participation in the Dillon Round of GATT negotiations. 
4.4.4  Trade Remedies and VERs 
The activity of the industry created considerable concern in Japan. The Japa- 
nese feared that the textile industry would either win special protection from 
the U.S. Congress or succeed in limiting the authority that Congress would 
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In August  1955 the Textile Export Council of Japan established a committee 
of government and industry members to develop a solution for the situation in 
the United States. This committee  sent a team  to Washington where it met 
with US.  industry officials. The U.S. industry team reported to the U.S. State 
Department that the Japanese were willing to negotiate  a settlement, but the 
State Department replied that they would vigorously oppose quotas, even ne- 
gotiated quotas. The US. industry, however, carried their case to the White 
House and President Eisenhower asked his chief of staff, Sherman Adams, to 
meet  with  the  Japanese.  As  a  result  of  these  negotiations,  the  Japanese 
industry-government textile committee announced in December 1955 that they 
intended to restrict their 1956 exports to the United States of cotton cloth and 
of cotton blouses (Brandis 1982,9). 
The U.S. industry took steps to assure that these limits would be put in place 
but at the same time viewed the arrangement as inadequate. The arrangement 
covered too few products, and it covered only Japan. The industry also pre- 
ferred a restraint  system that did not depend on the Japanese government or 
industry for enforcement, that is, in which the U.S. administration would have 
the legal authority to enforce the limits at the U.S. border. 
In this regard, the industry achieved an important victory when it won (in 
May 1956) the addition of section 204 to the Agriculture Act of  1956. Section 
204 authorized the president to negotiate with foreign governments to limit the 
export to the United States of agricultural or textile products, and to carry out 
such an  agreement  by  limiting the  entry  of  such products  into the  United 
States. Several companies also petitioned the Tariff Commission for “escape 
clause” investigations. 
But the industry was learning that creating the legal authority for the presi- 
dent to limit imports of textiles is one thing, inducing him to use that authority 
is another. While these administrative mechanisms provided  additional trib- 
unes to which the industry could present its case for protection, none of  the 
petitions led directly to import relief. The behavior of the U.S. government and 
Japanese industry provides some insight into the politics of the matter. 
Section 22, added to the AAA on August 24, 1935, authorizes the president 
to impose import fees or quotas to restrict imports of agricultural commodities 
or the products thereof if those imports render or tend to render ineffective or 
materially  interfere with US. agricultural programs. The section, by design, 
was similar in scope and purpose to section 3(e) of the NIRA.‘* 
12. According to Cordell Hull, President Franklin Roosevelt saw the AAA and the NIRA as the 
centerpieces of his economic policy and, derivatively, sections 22 and 3(e) as the centerpieces of 
his trade policy-at  least of the economics of his trade policy. Thus Hull (1948, 353) writes: 
The President, still pursuing the theory of retaining full discretionary authority to fix tariff rates 
at any height deemed necessary for the successful operation of  the AAA and NIRA, was slow 
to embrace my liberal trade proposal. . . . 
Gradually, however, the forces favoring high tariffs, together with a number of the President’s 
economic advisors connected with the NIRA and AAA, increasingly urged him to abandon the 
idea of  tariff reductions in order that our Government might, if  necessary, impose restrictions 
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The first attempt by  the textile industry to use section 22 occurred in  1939. 
President Roosevelt however directed the Tariff Commission to undertake sep- 
urute investigations of raw cotton and of cotton textile products. Price support 
programs under the AAA had moved U.S. fiber prices above world prices and 
had attracted substantial foreign sales. At the same time, the domestic price of 
cotton being higher than the world price put textile manufacturers at a disad- 
vantage vis-a-vis foreign manufacturers. 
In 1939, within four weeks of the president’s directive to the Tariff Commis- 
sion, the commission had reported in the affirmative on cotton fiber, and the 
president ordered  a tight quota on imports. But the commission  delayed for 
more than two years its investigation  of imports of cotton manufactures  and 
eventually terminated the investigation  when World War I1 disrupted foreign 
supply and revived domestic demand. 
In 1955, the Eisenhower administration exploited the fact that there were no 
deadlines for the various steps in the section 22 process  and left the matter 
tied up in the secretary of agriculture’s preliminary  investigation. Continued 
pressure however from the industry and its congressional delegation eventually 
won a meeting with the secretary of commerce plus the relevant assistant secre- 
taries of state, commerce, and agriculture. In this meeting the government of- 
fered a three-point program:  (I) urge third countries to import more from Ja- 
pan; (2) impose a fee equalizing the internal and the world prices of cotton on 
all textile exports; and (3)  exchange formal diplomatic notes with Japan, offi- 
cially taking note of Japan’s VERs. 
The industry  continued  to press for legislative action  and came within  a 
43-45  Senate vote of attaching to a foreign aid bill an amendment mandating 
textile import quotas. 
All the while,  government-to-government  negotiations continued with Ja- 
pan. These resulted, in January  1957, in the Japanese government announcing 
a comprehensive plan to control textile exports to the United States (Brandis 
1982, 26). 
Throughout the negotiations with Japan, the executive avoided the activation 
of  section 22’s  authority to restrict imports. Though the textile industry had 
petitioned  in  1955 for section  22 action,  when  the restraint  agreement  was 
concluded in 1957 the secretary of agriculture still had not completed his pre- 
liminary  investigation.  As in  1939, the administration  was reluctant  to take 
steps that would provide it explicit legal authority to restrict textile imports.I3 
Hull’s description of how he won President Franklin Roosevelt’s support for the RTAA suggests 
that President Roosevelt saw its value entirely in its foreign policy dimensions: that hc saw its 
economic dimensions as costs. not as benefits. 
13. No restriction was the administration’s preferred outcome, negotiated restrictions its fallback 
position. The following statement by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles is characteristic of the 
liberal, foreign policy view of trade policy that dominated administration thinking: “The United 
States does not have a single import quota on manufactured products, and to restrict trade at a time 
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The Japanese industry and government seemed to share that concern. Bauge 
(1987, 129) points out that soon after the Tariff Commission initiated an inves- 
tigation of injury from imports of a product, for example, cotton gingham, the 
Japanese government announced exports limits on the product. While the es- 
cape clause allowed the president discretion not to act even when the Tariff 
Commission returned an affirmative injury finding and recommended  import 
relief, it did not give the president discretion to prevent a Tariff Commission 
investigation. An interested party could petition the commission directly, and 
the commission had no authority to turn down a valid petition. 
4.4.5  Hong Kong Holds Out 
As the industry was convincing the executive to arrange a VER with Japan, 
Hong Kong was becoming a significant exporter. Hong Kong in 196  1 supplied 
almost 35 percent of US.  imports of cotton textiles in 1961, up from less than 
half of  1 percent in 1956. But Hong Kong proved more difficult than Japan to 
push into a voluntary agreement.I4  As a foreign policy matter, Hong Kong was 
important to the United States as a capitalist example and as a post for gather- 
ing information on China. And Hong Kong was a colony of the United King- 
dom, thereby enjoying the benefits of the special relationship that existed in the 
post-World  War I1 years between the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Furthermore, Hong Kong had earlier agreed to limit its textile exports to the 
United Kingdom and had learned several hard lessons from that experience. 
With  Hong  Kong  exports  restrained,  India's  and Pakistan's  exports  to the 
United  Kingdom began to grow. And as soon as Hong Kong had  agreed to 
restraints on exports to the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Switzer- 
land had begun  to press for similar restraints,  including restraints  on Hong 
Kong exports to France's colonies and former colonies in Africa. The United 
Kingdom had promised to support Hong Kong in resisting such expansion of 
the restraints to other countries but had not proved vigorous in doing so. 
Furthermore,  Hong Kong had fewer economic alternatives than Japan. In- 
deed, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) at the time was 
counseling the Japanese textile industry to move from cotton textiles to syn- 
thetics. Hong  Kong, on the other hand, had to find some way  for a rapidly 
increasing population to earn a living, as continuing numbers crossed the bor- 
der from China. Providing a job, particularly in the clothing industry, required 
minimal investment and demanded minimal skill. 
There were pressures within Hong Kong that favored negotiation of export 
limits. Aggarwal  (1985, 68ff.) points to the problem  that small Hong  Kong 
exporters were creating for larger companies. Just as Japan was seeing its sales 
severely weaken the United States and the free world" (Quoted by  Bauge 1987, 128; from US. 
Department of  State, Deparfmenr of  Srute Bullefin 31 no. 861 [December 26, 19551: 105). 
Dulles added that he would prefer to see domestic industry protected by voluntary action of the 
exporting nations. 
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of cotton manufactures displaced by Hong Kong sales, large Hong Kong man- 
ufacturers were aggressively courting buyers who came to Hong Kong. Aggar- 
wal quotes the Fur Eastern Economic Review calling for the Hong Kong gov- 
ernment to step in to control exports to the  United  States unless the small 
manufacturers would “agree to temper their ambition” (Aggarwal  1985,69). 
A second factor that pushed toward Hong Kong accepting limits was a sug- 
gestion by President Eisenhower that the U.S. government would, as a quid 
pro quo, support US.  private investment in Hong Kong. 
Hong Kong, in December  1959, offered to limit for three years its exports 
of five categories of garments but asked for growth allowances of  10-15  per- 
cent and for provision to carry forward any quota not used in a year. The U.S. 
industry refused to accept, and imports from Hong Kong were not controlled 
until the Short Term Arrangement had been signed and the US.  Congress had 
delegated to the president the power to enforce limits at the U.S. border. 
4.4.6  How the Executive Frustrated the Use of Trade Remedies 
The industry attempted again in 1959 and in 1961 to use section 22. In June 
1959 the National Cotton Council  and the American Textile Manufacturers 
Institute (ATMI) filed with the secretary of  agriculture a section 22 petition 
that asked for quotas on cotton textile and apparel imports. President Eisen- 
hower took  advantage of administrative  regulations that had been  issued by 
President Roosevelt in 1937.15  He directed the Tariff Commission to investigate 
but severely limited the scope of the commission’s investigation. He directed 
the commission to investigate if it were necessary, in order to prevent cotton 
textile imports from interfering with the cotton export program, to impose a 
fee on imported cotton textiles equal to the amount of the subsidy on raw cot- 
ton exports (Brandis 1982, 14). 
Thus, President Eisenhower’s directive to the Tariff Commission frustrated 
the industry’s petition. It eliminated quotas as a possible form of relief. More 
critically, it focused the investigation on how textile imports affected the cotton 
export program rather the cotton price support program. 
In June 1960, the commission ruled 4-2  that textile imports were not in- 
terfering with the cotton export program. 
In  1961, after President Eisenhower had retired and John F.  Kennedy was 
president, the industry filed a similar petition. It met the same fate. The Tariff 
Commission, proceeding within  a presidential  specification  that was in sub- 
15. The administrative regulations to implement section 22 provided for a preliminary investiga- 
tion by  the secretary of agriculture, who then makes his recommendations to the president. The 
president, in turn, would direct either that no further action be taken, or that the Tariff Commission 
make a full  investigation. The regulations also provided that the secretary of agriculture would 
prescribe the manner in which requests for action under the section should be submitted by  inter- 
ested parties. Because the directive to the Tariff Commission would come from the president, and 
because the secretary of agriculture served at the pleasure of the president, the regulations gave to 
the president the authority to define the terms of the investigation. 213  The MFA Paradox: More Protection and More Trade? 
stance the same as what President Eisenhower had delivered in the 1959 case, 
again ruled 4-2  that textile imports were not interfering with the cotton export 
program (Brandis 1982, 15). 
At about the same time the ATMI asked for quotas on imports of  cotton, 
synthetic fiber, silk, and wool products under the national security provisions 
of  the  Trade Agreements  Act.  The ATMI  pressed  the  matter  on occasion 
through the 1960s, but the executive took advantage of the absence of a time 
limit on such investigations and never announced a decision. 
4.5  The 1960s: Protection Made Multilateral 
The textile industry, by the beginning of  the  1960s, felt that it was being 
squeezed between U.S. agricultural policy and U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. 
agricultural programs maintained fiber prices in the United States above world 
levels; to export at least a part of  surplus production, the government paid a 
subsidy on exports. The export subsidy the U.S. government paid was particu- 
larly onerous since it gave foreign competitors access to U.S. cotton at a price 
below what the U.S. industry had to pay. 
At the same time, the executive branch of the U.S. government viewed trade 
policy primarily  as foreign policy. The executive  resisted  the  industry’s at- 
tempts to gain legislated restrictions, and it exploited loopholes in adminis- 
tered protection to frustrate the industry’s attempts to use that protection. The 
executive  worked not just to avoid using the  authority these administrative 
mechanisms conferred to restrict textile imports, it worked to avoid that author- 
ity being conferred. 
For the industry, the main lesson of the 1950s was that the executive, even 
when the legal authority to restrict textile imports was available, would be re- 
luctant to do so. And though industry-to-industry contacts with the Japanese 
indicated a willingness on the part of Japan to restrain imports, the U.S. State 
Department appeared to the industry to be openly hostile to negotiating such 
restrictions. The industry’s strategy thus became more directly a political one, 
a strategy that looked for opportunities to bring the power of the industry to 
bear on national elections.I6 
As to the mechanics of restricting imports, the strategy of the industry was 
still to press for import quotas.” Quotas were the preferred instrument because 
the industry concluded that they had little chance in the existing political cli- 
mate of  winning tariffs  sufficiently high to make up the difference between 
their costs and those of Japan and Hong Kong.IX 
The eventual focus on the VER as the standard policy instrument was less a 
16. From conversations with textile industry association spokespersons. 
17. The South Carolina legislature in 1955 passed a law requiring each business that sold Japa- 
nese textiles to post a sign in  its front window announcing that it sold Japanese goods. While 
quotas were the industry’s preferred instrument, they were not the only instrument it would use. 
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matter of  strategy than  an accommodation to the circumstances the industry 
itself faced. Negotiation was an important part of  the ethos of  trade policy. 
Unilateral action violated the Wilsonian principle of  international rule of law 
and the populist idea that cooperation made for good neighbors. It also brought 
back memories of the beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the 193Os.l9 
The idea of negotiating a multilateral  agreement to legitimize and regulate 
these restrictions was likewise an accommodation rather than a strategy. In all 
then, the path from the first VERs with Japan on cotton textiles to the MFA 
was less a grand design than a sequence of  steps that were guided, one at a 
time, by circumstance. 
4.5.1  President Kennedy and the First Multilateral Agreements’” 
To win the presidency, John Kennedy focused on New England, the tradi- 
tional  Democratic  party  strongholds, the  northern  industrial  states, and  the 
South. A promise of protection for the textile industry would help in the South 
and in New England: it would be particularly  important in the South, where 
Kennedy’s Catholicism was a significant liability. And polls indicated a close 
race with Republican candidate Richard M. Nixon. 
Kennedy’s pledge to make a solution to the cotton textile import problem a 
top priority of his administration won the support of several Southern leaders, 
including Luther Hodges, a textile  executive and former governor of  North 
Carolina, Governor Ernest Hollings of  South Carolina,  and Governor Terry 
Sanford of North Carolina. The cotton textile industry evaluated John Kenne- 
dy’s promise  of  support  as more concrete  than  Richard  Nixon’s, and many 
members of the industry worked actively to support Kennedy’s election.*’ 
By the fall of  1961, the Trade Expansion Act (TEA) had become an im- 
portant part both of President John F. Kennedy’s foreign policy and economic 
agenda. As it had been to other postwar presidents, to President Kennedy and 
to his allies in the government, commercial diplomacy was first of all a tool of 
foreign policy. Through a new round of GATT negotiations the president could 
build a relationship with the increasingly successful European Common Mar- 
ket and thereby  renew the  strategic alliance between the United States and 
Western Europe. He could also take the lead on special measures to help devel- 
19. In addition, the VER is consistent with the “property rights” implicit in the GATT. The basic 
element in the GATT is an exchange of concessions, an exchange between countries of the right 
to access to each other’s market. If  a country wants to take back some of the access it has thus 
“sold’-impose  a new import restriction-it  owes compensation to the trading parties that “own” 
that concession. If compensation is not made, trading parties have the right to retaliate, i.e., take 
back an equal amount of the market access that they had “paid’ to the offending country. GATT 
provides separate processes to decide offense, compensation,and retaliation. A VER considers all 
of the rights in one negotiation and thus provides for efficient trade-offs. This view is elaborated 
in Finger (1984). 
20. This section draws extensively from Zeiler (1992). 
21. Textile industry association officials told us that the two Eisenhower elections had not been 
close enough for them to extract significant commitments from either side. 215  The MFA Paradox: More Protection and More Trade? 
oping countries, bringing them on board of  his aggressive Cold War policy. 
Kennedy hoped that the TEA would boost U.S. export competitiveness thereby 
helping to slake the U.S. payments imbalance and the gold drain. The act also 
took on some of  the burden to stimulate the domestic economy: it became 
something of a panacea for present problems and future circumstances, foreign 
and domestic. 
But President Kennedy was also a New Dealer: he felt it was the govern- 
ment’s job to cure economic distress. Before he became president he had sup- 
ported  import restrictions  of particular  interest  to New  England  industries, 
among them textiles and fish processors. The rhetoric Kennedy had used to 
explain his position on trade was the usual. He attacked imports as the result 
of  “cutthroat competition” from foreigners; he disagreed with “unjustifiable 
protection” but felt that “a tariff to equalize competition is necessary.” 
President Kennedy sought no common denominator between what he saw 
as the benefits and the risks of  negotiating down U.S. protection. Striking a 
balance was not a philosophical process, it was a political one. To explain how 
President Kennedy went about putting together the votes needed to pass the 
act, Zeiler quotes a Kennedy associate: “You want the votes, you give the guy 
the post-office.’’ In the Boston school of politics in which John F. Kennedy was 
trained, this was how philosophical differences were reconciled. 
The textile industry, particularly the cotton textile industry, had been press- 
ing forward on several fronts to gain import protection  and other forms of 
government support. To win their support for the TEA, President Kennedy in 
May 1961 offered a seven-point program that included: action to eliminate or 
offset the raw  cotton price differential;  assurance that careful consideration 
would be given to a textile industry application for protection under the escape 
clause or the national  security provisions of trade law; and direction to the 
State Department to convene a conference of textile-importing and exporting 
countries to develop an international agreement governing textile trade.** 
Zeiler reports (1992,86) that by March 1962, President Kennedy had imple- 
mented or had made commitments that would soon implement all seven points. 
The highlights of  Kennedy’s actions (see also table 4.4 for a chronology of 
events) were the following: 
July  1961: The Short Term Arrangement (STA) on Cotton Textiles was 
February 1962: The Long Term Arrangement (LTA) on Cotton Textiles was 
April  1962: President Kennedy embargoed eight categories of cotton tex- 
June 1962: Congress passed and President Kennedy signed a bill giving the 
signed. 
signed. 
tiles from Japan. 
22. These three, according to Brandis (1982,  19), were the points of  major interest to the in- 
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The Short Term Arrangement (STA) is agreed. 
The Long Term Arrangement (LTA) is agreed, to commence 
October  I, 1962, to last for five years. 
The United States tries and fails to secure an international 
agreement on wool products. 
The United States tries and fails to negotiate restraints on Japanese 
exports of wool products. 
The United Kingdom implements a global quota scheme in 
violation of the LTA-the  LTA  providing only for product-specific 
restraints. 
Agreement is reached to extend the LTA  for three years. 
Agreement is reached to extend the LTA  for three years. It was 
later extended three months more, to fill the gap until the MFA 
came into effect. 
United States negotiates VERs with Asian suppliers on wool and 
man-made fibers. 
The MFA is agreed, to commence January  I, 1974, and to last for 
four years. 
The European Economic Community and the United States 
negotiate bilateral agreements with developing countries prior to 
agreeing to extension of the MFA. 
The MFA is extended for four years. 
The MFA is extended for four years and seven months. 
The MFA is renewed for five years. The Reagan administration, 
under pressure from increased imports resulting from dollar 
appreciation, negotiates tough quotas. 
The MFA  is  extended  pending  outcome  of  the  Uruguay  Round 
negotiations. 
The Uruguay Round draft final act provides for a 10-year phase-out 
of all MFA and other quotas on textiles. 
president  authority  to  limit  imports  from  nonsigners  to  a  multilateral 
agreement.23 
The textile industry kept its part of the bargain. As Zeiler (1992, 86) reports 
their reaction: “[Kennedy] earned an acknowledgment from the journal Textile 
World that [he] had ‘gone to bat for the industry.’ The National Cotton Council 
announced its support for the Trade Expansion Act because of the ‘exceptional 
treatment’ given by  Kennedy to the textile import problem. Victory was defi- 
nitely  his,  however,  when  the  American  Cotton  Manufacturers  Institute 
thanked him on March 31, 1962, for his ‘unprecedented degree of thoughtful 
consideration and constructive action for textiles.’ The ACMI then endorsed 
the Trade Expansion Act.” 
In June 1962 Congress passed the TEA of  1962. Two-thirds of Congressman 
23. The two-price cotton problem was not resolved until April  1964 when President Lyndon B. 
Johnson signed a bill that established a payment-in-kind program that  made cotton available to 
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Carl Vinson’s (D-Ga.) Textile Conference Group voted for the bill and against 
critical amendments that would have substituted a bill that offered consider- 
ably restricted negotiating authority to the president. Eighty-two of  105 House 
Southern Democrats  voted  for the  act, and in the  Senate,  19 of  20 South- 
erner~.*~ 
4.5.2  Provisions of the LTA 
The STA provided for one-year restrictions of  imports of  cotton products 
and for further international negotiations to develop a long-term solution. Be- 
fore it expired, the LTA  had been agreed (see table 4.4). 
The main operative provision of the LTA  was article 3. That article provided 
that whenever imports of a particular product caused or threatened market dis- 
ruption, the importing country could request the exporting country to restrict 
its exports. While the arrangement specified that the request for restraint  be 
accompanied by a “detailed factual statement of the reasons for the request,” 
it implicitly left to the importing country the authority to determine when “dis- 
ruption” was present or threatened. 
Annex  B  specified that the minimum level to which exports could be re- 
strained was the level of actual imports for the  12-month period ending three 
months before the restraint  went into effect. If the restraint was in effect for 
more than one year, the restraint level should be increased by at least 5 percent 
each year. Market disruption did not have to be demonstrated again for re- 
newal. 
Article 3 also provided  that if  60 days after an importing country had re- 
quested  an exporting country  to restrain, no agreement  to do so had  been 
reached, the importing country could take unilateral action, subject to annex 
B’s statement of minimum levels. 
Article 4  specified that the arrangement “shall not prevent the application of 
mutually acceptable arrangements on other terms not inconsistent with the ba- 
sic objectives of this arrangement.” 
The 1984 GATT textile study (1984,73) points out that bilateral agreements 
negotiated  under article 4 eventually  became the form of  application of  the 
arrangement preferred both by  the United States and by exporting countries. 
Article  3  agreements  had  to  be  renewed  each  12  months,  longer-term 
agreements were administratively  convenient for the United States and pro- 
vided exporters greater long-range security (Aggarwal 1985, 9  1). 
Several factors contributed to other countries acquiescing to U.S. pressure 
24. Textile restrictions were not the only deal President Kennedy made for the TEA. Senator 
Robert S. Kerr of  Oklahoma led the congressional delegation that represented the oil producers. 
The price to lift Kerr’s opposition to the TEA was the Arkansas River Bill-federal  money  to 
make the Arkansas River navigable into Oklahoma. “You know, Bob, I never really understood 
the Arkansas River bill before today,” President Kennedy remarked as he accepted the deal (Zeiler 
1992, 114). 
President Kennedy was criticized by members of his own party for the mercenary way in which 
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for a multilateral agreement to limit textile exports. Not the least of these, of 
course, was the power of U.S. pressure at the time. Japan, for its part, had not 
yet gained the economic strength that allowed it to hold out for several years 
against the expansion of the agreement to wool and man-made fibers. In  1962, 
Japan still had a trade deficit with the United States. 
Many European countries had retained their post-World  War  I1 quotas on 
Japanese textiles when Japan acceded to the GATT. Japan viewed a multilateral 
agreement as possibly  improving  its access to European  markets. Also, the 
Japanese and U.S.  cotton textile industries had been  in close contact in the 
1930s and had reestablished that contact in the  1950s. The Japanese industry 
had  considered  generous  the  quotas  it  had  negotiated  previously  with  the 
United States. Many European countries had imposed similar quotas on devel- 
oping country  exports, in many cases declaring them under the balance-of- 
payments provision (article XII) of the GATT. When GATT regulations on use 
of  balance-of-payments provisions by  developed countries were tightened in 
1958, these European countries were left looking for GATT cover for restric- 
tions they were reluctant to remove (Aggarwal 1985,73). 
As to the  exporting countries,  U.S.  pressure  was probably  the  most  im- 
portant  factor.  It  is possible  that  exporting  countries  viewed  a  multilateral 
agreement as an instrument the U.S. government might use to resist rather than 
to advance the proposals of the U.S. industry. A similar argument had been 
applied in generic terms to the GATT, and the U.S. government had displayed 
a reluctance to use the authority to restrict textile imports that US. law pro- 
vided. In  addition, there was fear of an individual exporting country getting 
left out in the country-by-country bargaining that seemed to be the real alterna- 
tive to a multilateral agreement. Hong Kong, after agreeing to limit its exports 
to the United Kingdom, had lost to India and Pakistan some of its share of the 
U.K. import market. 
A final factor is that the exporting countries may  have underestimated the 
authority over textile imports that the combination of a multilateral agreement 
and domestic law, particularly section 204 of the Agriculture Act, would pro- 
vide. Section 204 (passed in May 1956) authorized the president to negotiate 
with foreign governments to limit the export to the United States of agricultural 
or textile products, and to carry out such an agreement by limiting the entry of 
such products into the United States. The LTA  thus activated the president’s 
“204” authority in place, and President Kennedy quickly imposed limits on sev- 
eral categories of  imports from Hong Kong. By the end of  1963, the United 
States had in place restrictions against 17 countries (Keesing and Wolf 1980,38). 
4.5.3  Evolution and Expansion into the MFA 
Richard  Nixon, running for the presidency in  1968 against Hubert Hum- 
phrey, had learned from the  1960 lesson of the power of  the textile industry. 
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would include wool and man-made fiber products. Japan by this time was in a 
stronger position, and experience with the STA and LTA  had taught exporting 
countries what they could expect from an international agreement. 
The provisions of the MFA reflected a shift of power toward the exporting 
countries. The hortatory  statement of  the agreement’s intentions is more de- 
tailed and more extensive about the expansion of exports of  developing coun- 
tries. The agreement also urges importing countries who restrict  imports to 
pursue policies to promote adjustment. Article 3, as did the parallel article in 
the STA, provides for an importing country to seek from an exporting country 
an agreement to limit its exports, it also provides that the importing country 
may take unilateral action if agreement is not reached within 60 days. Annual 
limits, whether agreed or unilateral, were to be based on the 12 months ending 
two months  before. If  a limit was extended, the minimum  growth rate was 
6 percent. 
There were two significant differences between the MFA and the LTA: 
1. The MFA  did  not  provide  for  “mutually  acceptable  arrangements  on 
other terms;” that is, there was no end-around the limits the arrangement put 
on allowable quotas. 
2. MFA created a multilateral surveillance institution, the Textiles Surveil- 
lance Body (TSB), to supervise the functioning of  the arrangement. Partici- 
pants were required to report safeguard actions to the TSB, which reviews their 
conformity with the provisions of the arrangement. The TSB is also the forum 
for dispute settlement. 
The extensions of the MFA through 1986  tended to shift the balance toward 
tighter import restrictions. In 1977, at the urging of  the European Economic 
Community, a provision was added to allow “jointly agreed reasonable depar- 
tures” from the limits of the agreement. This provision  shifted greater power 
to the individual countries negotiating the bilateral agreements under the MFA, 
away from a multilateral solution. In negotiating bilateral agreements, indus- 
trial countries were much less likely to care about opening up new markets 
and much more concerned about protecting their industries from additional 
imports. Aggarwal  (1 985) argues that the combination of  the  1977 provision 
and the important role of bilateral agreements in implementing the provisions 
of the MFA exacerbated the trend toward more protection. 
In the rest of this paper, we focus on the scope and impact of the protection 
received  under the  MFA. While the  protection the US. textile industry  re- 
ceived was substantial, it was, to some degree, leaky. Although the U.S. gov- 
ernment was forced to establish the legal statements of the multilateral arrange- 
ments and their implementation in domestic law-principally  in section 204, 
as amended, of  the Agriculture Act-considerable  effort was applied within 
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4.6  Protection, but Not Complete Protection 
While the protection won by the industry was substantial, policymakers re- 
mained uneasy with the extent of trade restrictions in textiles. Officials who 
were chosen to lead the negotiations were often aggressively protrade; imple- 
mentation of the agreements has often been lax. The ultimate test is provided 
by  the impact of these restrictions on imports, domestic production,  and the 
overall health of the industry. Textile imports as a percentage of U.S. consump- 
tion are now four times higher than they were in  1960; apparel imports are 
seven  times  higher. The industry  never  completely  overcame the  executive 
branch’s reluctance to provide protection and the trading community’s inven- 
tiveness at finding ways to evade the mechanisms of restriction. 
4.6.1 
One early example of  the reluctance to embrace managed trade in textiles 
is provided by President Kennedy’s candidate for negotiating the multilateral 
restraint  agreement.  Kennedy  gave the position  to George Ball, then under 
secretary of  state for economic affairs.2s Ball was a leading internationalist in 
the U.S. government and a leading spokesperson for the foreign policy view 
of trade policy. In the first year of the Kennedy administration he had been the 
State Department  official responsible  for the administration  of  US. foreign 
aid, and he had led the reorganization of this administration into the Agency 
for International Development. He also had the lead within the Kennedy ad- 
ministration on the TEA. 
While we have located no public statement by Ball that reveals his opinion 
of  the textile negotiations that he led, his feelings on textile restraints are re- 
vealed by a later statement regarding textile negotiations during the Nixon ad- 
ministration:  “If  our relations  with Europe have  suffered from neglect  and 
presumptuousness,  interspersed  with occasional pettiness . . . the Nixon Ad- 
ministration was reckless to the point of irresponsibility when it weakened the 
alliance ties that bound Japan to the West. The primal cause of the deterioration 
of relations was a tradesman’s argument over the export of Japanese textiles to 
the United States” (Ball 1976, 175). 
After President Kennedy assigned Ball to negotiate a textile agreement, Ball 
visited  several national capitals to line up support. According to the ATMI, 
Ball’s briefing to them on his findings included the following points: 
The State Department is opposed to United States control of textile product 
It intends to seek agreement only on cotton textiles. 
It proposes to use the 1960 level of imports as the base. 
Negotiation and Implementation of the Textile Agreements 
imports. 
25. A textile executive who was then active in industry politics told us that Ball was “embar- 
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It plans for the agreement to provide for increases of  5 percent (quoted by 
Brandis 1982, 20; from the ATMI report to its membership). 
Senator Pastore and Congressman Vinson organized a group of 39 senators 
and  124 representatives to protest the State Department position  directly to 
President Kennedy (Brandis 1982,21),  but the draft arrangement the U.S. dele- 
gation took to the negotiations contained these terms, and these terms are the 
ones in the agreed arrangement. 
To oversee the textile program President Kennedy created the Cabinet Tex- 
tile Advisory Committee and a lower level committee now named the Commit- 
tee for Implementation of the Textile Agreements (CITA). These committees 
include representatives of the Departments of  Commerce, State, Labor, and 
Treasury, and the Office of the Trade Representative. The day-to-day process 
of implementing the agreements goes somewhat as follows.26 
The MFA provides for restraint of imports that cause “market disruption.” 
When the textile industry feels that market disruption is occurring in a particu- 
lar product category, they make the facts known to CITA. 
CITA meets usually at the level of deputy assistant secretary (senior civil 
service), with the Commerce Department representative chairing. The CITA 
presents its own “disruption statement,” on which the industry often comments. 
That comment often includes the provision of more-current data on the state 
of the domestic industry: output, prices, employment, and so forth. Sometimes 
an  industry  association  surveys U.S. companies to  obtain up-to-date  infor- 
mation, then submits these data as a comment on the CITA’s disruption state- 
ment. 
The basic factual inputs into the disruption report are quantities and unit 
values of imports that have an adverse impact on the U.S. industry. These data 
are buttressed with data on domestic production, employment, capacity utiliza- 
tion, and so forth. Sometimes other relevant information is provided, such as a 
decision by a U.S. producer to cancel an investment or expansion plan. 
In the end, industry officials insist, there  is a loose relation between  the 
disruption  statement and  the  quota  that  is set. Although  the  decision  on 
whether to impose a quota appears to be significantly influenced by industry 
recommendations, industry representatives argue that quota levels are often set 
at levels which are much higher than they requested. Under MFA rules, the 
United States may set an initial quota on a new product, but the United States 
must then enter into negotiations with the exporting country to agree a final 
quota level. While the Commerce Department administrators are usually sym- 
pathetic to the industry’s position, the final quota level must be negotiated by 
the trade representative with the exporting country and must win the approval 
of the interagency committee. This committee includes two “general interest” 
departments, State and Treasury. Often the final level is more than twice the 
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level of  the initial quota, and even the initial quota is larger than  the  limit 
actually needed to stop market disruption. 
From the industry’s perspective, there are some who feel that the restraint 
agreements have not been rigorously enforced. The ATMI evaluated that in the 
12 months the STA was in force, imports were one-third higher than  if  the 
minimums  the agreement  allowed had been  achieved. The same evaluation 
concluded that “while President Johnson successfully pushed through legisla- 
tion abolishing the two-price system, his administration was much weaker in 
carrying out the textile import quota system” (Brandis 1982, 27ff.). 
In  1984, when imports surged as the dollar appreciated, the ATMI testified 
that through the first 10 months of  1984, of the imports of uncontrolled prod- 
ucts that were causing market disruption and eligible for a “call” under the 
MFA, only one-third had in fact been called. A call is a notification to an ex- 
porting country that its exports of a particular product are causing market dis- 
ruption, and that a preliminary quota will be imposed. 
Another way to soften enforcement of limits is through the various dimen- 
sions of customs enforcement, for example, lax policing  of transshipment of 
Chinese textiles  through countries not under restraint  or unable  to fill their 
quotas from their  own production. A recent agreement  between  the United 
States and China involved allegations that transshipment of Chinese textiles to 
the United States exceeded $2 billion per year. Since China’s textile exports to 
the United  States under the MFA were  $4.68 billion  in  1993, this  suggests 
that transshipments could raise export levels to 150 percent of actual quotas 
(Financial Times 1994). 
4.6.2  Impact of Protection on the Health of the Industry 
The changing economic situation of  the textile and apparel sectors is de- 
scribed in appendix table 4A.1. In  1960, apparel and textile employment to- 
gether accounted for 13.4 percent of  total  manufacturing employment. That 
share declined moderately over a 20-year period: by 1985, the textile and ap- 
parel industries combined still accounted for 10 percent of total employment 
in manufacturing. Although union membership in most sectors has rapidly de- 
clined, the share of unionization  in textiles and apparel remained almost con- 
stant, declining slightly between  1960 and 1980. 
As a share of  total manufacturing output, textile and apparel production fell 
from slightly over 7 percent of  total output in  1960 to 4.4 percent of total 
manufacturing output in 1985. Despite the nearly 50 percent fall in manufac- 
turing share, relative wages remained fairly stable and capital’s share in value 
added increased. Wages in the textile industry were on average 65 percent of 
average wages in the rest of  manufacturing, a figure which  remained stable 
until  1985. In apparel, where the inroads made by  import competition  were 
steeper, relative wages fell from 56 percent of average manufacturing wages in 
1960 to 50 percent of average manufacturing wages in 1985. 
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costs, divided by the value of  shipments, actually rose in both  sectors. This 
value, which is labeled “profits” in table 4A.1, rose from 18 to 20 percent in 
textiles  and from 17 to 27 percent in apparel between  1960 and  1985. One 
interpretation of  the relatively stable wages and capital share during this 25- 
year period is that both labor and capital benefited from protectionist measures. 
There is no question that the protection won by the industry was substantial. 
Cline (1990, 191) estimates that quotas as of  1986 provided the equivalent of 
a 28 percent tariff on textiles and a 53 percent tariff on apparel. Other indus- 
tries on average enjoy tariffs of no more than 5 percent. Without this protec- 
tion, according to Cline, there would be about 2 1,000 fewer jobs in textiles and 
214,000 fewer in apparel production in the United States. 
The extent to which protection in the textile industry actually restricted im- 
ports is documented in figures 4.1 and 4.2. As indicated in figure 4.1, import 
penetration  in the textile sector appears to  have considerably  slowed under 
protection. In comparison to other industries, import penetration increased at a 
much slower rate. In the 198Os, however, import penetration rapidly increased. 
Figure 4.2 documents the changes in import penetration in the apparel sector. 
Although protection also appears to have dampened the upward trend in im- 
ports in the 1970s, increases in import penetration were much more dramatic 
than in textiles. In the 1980s, import penetration in apparel surged, growing at 
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import  penetration  increased  from  5.5  to  12.1 percent  in  textiles,  imports 
surged from  1.9 to 26.4 percent in apparel (table 4.A. I). In both sectors, ex- 
ports generally remained low, increasingly only around 1980 with the devalua- 
tion of the dollar in the late 1970s. 
The story presented in figures 4.1 and 4.2 and table 4A.  1 is supported by the 
evidence in table 4.5, which is taken  from Cline (1990). Table 4.5 presents 
changes in import volumes (not import penetration). The evidence does seem 
to suggest that the MFA slowed down import growth, particularly in the textile 
industry. After the MFA was introduced, growth rates in imports of textiles and 
apparel both fell. In textiles, growth rates became negative, and only recovered 
in the early  1980s. Table 4.5 also documents the significant increases in im- 
ports during the first half of the 1980s. Cline attributes these increases to the 
overvaluation of the dollar and recovery from the recession. 
The evidence suggests that textile imports kept pace with the rest of U.S. 
industry, while apparel imports surged ahead. The dramatic increases in ap- 
parel imports during the 1980s and early 1990s, as well as the more moderate 
increases in textile imports, is particularly illustrative of the leaky protection 
which has characterized the MFA. According to Cline, textile and apparel im- 
ports rose by  100 percent in real terms between  1983 and 1986. How could 
such an increase occur under a regime which was committed to import growth 
rates of no more than 6 percent annually? Evidently, quota allocations were 225  The MFA Paradox: More Protection and More Trade? 
Table 4.5  Annual Growth Rates of Real US.  Imports of Textiles and Apparel" 
(percent) 



































Source: Cline (1990, 170). 
'Calculated from log-linear regressions for each period. 
bSquare-yard  equivalents. 
cFigures are for 1964-72. 
sufficiently flexible and underutilized (see table 4.6) to allow the sudden in- 
crease. Nor, according to the  Congressional Budget Office, could these  in- 
creases  be  accounted  for by  imports  from unrestricted  sources  (see Cline 
1990). 
Although import protection saved thousands of jobs in textiles and apparel, 
it did not prevent significant downsizing of employment. Although as a share 
of total manufacturing employment, textiles and apparel only declined moder- 
ately, figures 4.3 and 4.4 document the significant downsizing of employment 
in the textile and apparel industries between  1958 and 1986. Downsizing was 
more significant in the textile than in the apparel industry. Between 1958 and 
1986, employment in textiles  shrank by 30 percent. In apparel, which faced 
even steeper import competition, employment declines only totaled 20 percent. 
By 1986, total employment in the two industries had shrunk to between 70 and 
80 percent of their 1958 levels. 
The textile industry was more successful in downsizing its labor force, in 
part due to technological advances in the industry which encouraged mechani- 
zation. However, productivity performance in both sectors has not been partic- 
ularly  impressive. Figure 4.5 shows the trends in output per worker for the 
textile, apparel, and other manufacturing sectors, Although the textile industry 
performed relatively better  than apparel, both  sectors lagged in productivity 
increases compared to the rest of manufacturing. The divergence between the 
rest of manufacturing and these two sectors appears to begin in the early 1970s, 
when the MFA was put in place. 
Using the NBER trade database, we also computed measures of total factor 
productivity  growth (TFPG) for textiles, apparel, and the rest of manufactur- 
ing. The trends in TFPG are reported in table 4.6. TFPG was calculated by 226  J. Michael Finger and Ann Harrison 
Table 4.6  Total Factor Productivity Growth in Textiles, Apparel, and the Rest 
of the Manufacturing Sector 
Sector  1959-72  1973-86 
Textiles  I .3  0.6 
Apparel  0.6  0.5 
Other manufacturing  I .2  1.4 
subtracting growth in labor (number of workers), material inputs, and capital 
stock from output growth. Labor and material inputs were weighted by  their 
shares in output. 
The trends in TFPG are similar to the trends in labor productivity. Prior to 
1973, productivity growth in textiles was slightly higher than the manufactur- 
ing average. Productivity increases in apparel, on the other hand, were signifi- 
cantly behind, averaging a 0.6 percent increase per year in comparison with 
1.2 percent for the rest of manufacturing. During the 1973-86  period, the gap 
widened even further. While TFPG averaged  I .4 percent for the rest of manu- 
facturing, productivity  growth for textiles  slipped to 0.6 percent and for ap- 
parel  to 0.5 percent. The net evidence seems to suggest that, at least in the 
apparel industry, protection did not serve as a vehicle for a productivity tum- 
MFAP  MFA3 
/’\ 
?  -.,, 
(\  /  ’-/. 
’5, / 
I 




?  74  76  78  80  82  84 
-Textile  Industry -=-All Other Industries 
Fig. 4.3 
other U.S. industry) 
Source: Abowd (1991). 
Nore: “Other” excludes both textiles and apparel. 
Employment in U.S. textile industry, 1958-86 (comparison with all 
6 YEAR 
-  Apparel Industry  --All Other Industries 
Fig. 4.4  Employment in US. apparel industry, 1958-86  (comparison with all 
other U.S. industry) 
Source: Abowd (1991). 
Note: “Other” excludes both textiles and apparel. 
MFAl  MFA2  MFA3 
r 
50 
58  60 
YEAR 
-Textile  Industry  --Apparel  Industry  *All  Other Industry 
Fig. 4.5  Real value of shipmentdemployment,  1958-86 
Source: Abowd (1991). 228  J.  Michael Finger and Ann Harrison 
around. The textile industry, while it performed slightly better than the industry 
average during the 1960s and early 1970s, lagged behind after 1973. 
The evidence presented above suggests that the protection granted to the 
industry, while substantial, was not enough to prevent significant increases in 
import competition. The MFA led to a decline in the growth rate of textile and 
apparel imports during the 1970s, but this decline was followed by a surge in 
the early 1980s when the dollar’s appreciation was combined with an economic 
recovery. The surge in imports during the 1980s provides persuasive evidence 
that MFA protection was certainly not complete. Additional evidence is pro- 
vided by U.S. administration efforts to implement protective legislation in less 
restrictive ways. 
4.7  Quantifying the Determinants of MFA Protection, 1981-89 
Despite the vast literature on protection in the U.S. textile industry, few stud- 
ies attempt to quantify the determinants of protection within the industry. Most 
empirical studies, such as the comprehensive study by Cline (1990) and the 
recent volume edited by Hamilton (1990), focus on either measuring welfare 
costs of protection  or evaluating its impact on industry profits, productivity, 
and trade. Cline (1 990), for example, estimates that the cost of textile and ap- 
parel protection (in 1986) amounted to between $20.3 billion and $40 billion 
annually. This translates to a cost per household of between  $240 and $500 
annually, in 1986 dollars. 
One area that has been almost entirely neglected is how U.S. policymakers 
allocate  import  quotas  across  exporting  countries.  One exception  is  Dean 
(1993), who evaluates MFA quota allocations across large and small exporting 
countries. Dean (1993) models the determinants of quota allocations as a func- 
tion of country size, export volumes, and export growth. She finds that the size 
of the exporter was a critical determinant of restraint under the MFA 1. In con- 
trast, under MFA2 and MFA3 she finds a strong bias toward restraining very 
small sellers and those whose exports grew rapidly. Benedict (1993) examines 
the allocation of VERs for a different industry-the  steel sector in the United 
States. He  also finds  that  large  countries  and  countries  with  rapid  export 
growth were more likely to be targeted. 
The political  economy  literature suggests that many other factors are im- 
portant in determining quotas, such as the health of the import-competing sec- 
tor, employment and wage trends, exchange rate movements, and the impor- 
tance of foreign markets as a destination for U.S. exports. The analysis below 
provides a comprehensive examination of which of these factors were the most 
important in determining the allocation of textile and apparel quotas. Our anal- 
ysis also differs from previous research by examining the entire 1980s, a period 
when  quotas expanded at a rapid pace. Finally, we also analyze the factors 
which determined the size of the allocated quotas-an  issue which has been 
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total export earnings for many developing countries. Understanding the deter- 
mination of quotas is consequently of practical importance. 
4.7.1  Empirical Framework 
The analytical models described in section 4.2, combined with the adminis- 
trative criteria for quota allocations outlined in section 4.6, suggest a relation- 
ship between the variables listed in table 4.7 and quota determination in the 
United  States. For each variable, table 4.7 indicates whether it serves as an 
MFA criterion for market disruption or whether it acts as a proxy for factors 
likely to be important in determining protection from theoretical models of 
endogenous protection. The last two columns in table 4.7 indicate whether the 
expected relationship between quotas and each of the variables is likely to be 
positive or negative. 
There are two columns of expected signs, one relating to the question, On 
which products imported from which countries is it more likely that there will 
be a quota? In this framework, we are simply trying to identify whether a quota 
will be imposed (i.e., the answer is either yes or no). The second column refers 
to the question, On which products imported from which countries is the im- 
port quota likely to be larger? A larger quota, of  course, is a less restrictive 
one; hence the signs in the last column are the reverse of the signs in the first 
column. 
The expected  sign is the one predicted by the model best proxied by  the 
variable. In reality, the distinction between the various models may be some- 
what blurred. For example, we list employment (number of workers) as a proxy 
for the adding machine model, which suggests that the number of employees 
(i.e., voters) will be positively correlated with the likelihood of a sector win- 
ning protection. But a large number of people working in a sector may present 
organizational problems, and hence the political organization models would 
suggest a negative correlation between number of workers and the likelihood 
of winning protection. However, we consider the latter a secondary fit between 
proxy and model and have not listed it in the table. As to proxies for organiza- 
tional problems, we consider the number of plants a better indicator of organi- 
zational problems than the number of workers. Within a plant, lines of commu- 
nication to workers are already established; hence the organizational challenge 
between plants will be more severe than between workers in a plant. 
Our principal hypothesis is that the process of imposing MFA-sanctioned 
quotas is not limited to taking into account only the criteria that the MFA speci- 
fies as justifying such quotas. We have placed at the top of the list of explana- 
tory variables those that are specified by the MFA as the criteria that justify an 
import quota. If there were no room for discretion in MFA administration, then 
these and only these variables would contribute significantly to the explanation 
of actual quota allocations. 
The second group of variables listed in table 4.7 are indirect proxies for 
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Table 4.7  Explanatory Variables: Their Relations with Alternative 
Models of Protection 
Variable 
Expected Sign 
Model Represented  Yes-No Quota  Size of Quota 
Change in U.S. production 
Change in employment 
Change in import penetration 
Import penetration 






Number of plants 
Plant size (employees per plant) 
Change in U.S. exports 
GDP growth in quota country 
Market disruption; MFA 
criterion 
Market disruption; MFA 
criterivn 
Market disruption: MFA 
criterion 
Market disruption: MFA 
criterion 
Market disruption; MFA 
criterion 
Market disruption; MFA 
criterion 
U.S. comparative advantage; 
lesser pressure from imports 
Expensive foreign currency 




riding from large numbers 
resources available for 
organization 




Equity concern; the poor are 
Political payoff; number of 
Political organization; free 
Political organization; 
Political organization, 
Value of market to U.S. 
Equity concern; the poor are 
+ 
+ 
the stronger should be US.  comparative advantage and the lower the likelihood 
that the sector will  experience a degree of  import competition  sufficient to 
cause it to ask for quota protection. The exchange rate, measuring the dollar 
cost of the exporting country’s currency should have a similar impact, though 
over time rather than across sectors. 
In the lower part of  the table we have listed the various political influences 
brought out by the models of protection reviewed in section 4.2. Some of these 
reflect domestic influences such as the number of  votes at stake or the ease 
with which the sector can organize or can control free riding. Others reflect 
international considerations such as the value of the market to U.S. exporters. 231  The MFA Paradox: More Protection and More Trade? 
4.7.2  Specifications 
To quantify the determinants of textile and garment quotas during the 198Os, 
we analyze two different dependent variables. We begin by examining the deci- 
sion to impose a quota, using data which covers both protected and unprotected 
products and countries. We  then examine the determination of quota levels, 
using a Tobit specification. We describe these two approaches in more detail 
below. 
We begin by addressing the following economic problem: what determines 
whether a quota will be imposed on a particular country or product? For a 
particular product i in country j  and time t, a quota is either imposed (  Y,,  = 1 ) 
or not (v,,  = 0).  Whether a quota is imposed is a function of both country- and 
product-specific  attributes, denoted by  the  vector x. This problem  could be 
rephrased as follows: 
Y,;, = Brxij,  + u$,. 
We assume that u has a logistic distribution. Y*  is not observed; what we do 
observe is the following: 
Y = 1 
Y = 0 
if  Y*  > 0 (i.e., a nonzero quota is imposed); 
otherwise (no quotas). 
This problem is a standard logit problem  which can be easily solved using 
conventional maximum likelihood estimation. We include the following vari- 
ables  in  the vector  x  as determinants  of  the  probability  of  protection:  (1) 
wages,,-, (MFA product category i at time t -  1), (2) total number of employ- 
ees,,-,, (3) total number of plants,,-,, (4) average plant size,, ,,  defined as em- 
ployees, ,-  ,/plants, ,-  ,, (5) change in U.S. production, ,- ,, (6)  change in import 
penetration,,-,, (7) import penetration[ ,-,,  (8) percentage change in U.S. ex- 
ports to countryj at time t, (9) GDP growth,, for trading partnerj at time t, (10) 
US.  bilateral (nominal) exchange rate with country j  at time t, (1  1) change in 
capital stock,,-,, (12) profits,,-,, and (13) the capitalAabor ratio in sector i at 
timer -  1. 
All variables except profits, capitaVlabor ratio, GDP growth, import penetra- 
tion, and U.S. production  are measured in logarithms. Wages are defined as 
average compensation per worker, deflated by the consumer price index. To 
avoid endogeneity problems, all variables except exchange rate, GDP growth, 
and change in U.S. exports are measured at time t -  1 for a quota imposed in 
period t  The change in import penetration is defined as import penetration at 
time t - 1 less import penetration at time t -  2. Changes in U.S. production 
and capital stock are defined as differences of lagged values as well. 
A second approach is not just to focus on whether a sector received quota 
protection  (yes or no) but to analyze what determines the relative magnitudes 
of quotas across different sectors. Since quotas were imposed for only 20 per- 232  J. Michael Finger and Ann Harrison 
cent of the 20,000 observations in the sample, the resulting function is likely 
to be highly nonlinear. Although ordinary least squares estimation would lead 
to biased estimates, Tobit estimation can be used to address the censoring prob- 
lem. The data is censored in the sense that we do not observe the quota level 
for a large share of the sample. However, unlike standard censoring problems, 
in which the dependent variable is generally censored from below (typically at 
zero), in this case the censoring occurs from above-absence  of a quota should 
be represented  not by  a 0 value,  but by  a number  large enough that  it has 
no restrictive effect. For a product on which no quota is imposed, the quota’s 
magnitude might be approximated by an arbitrarily large quota, greater than 
or equal to an upper limit denoted by  U. Then, equation (1) can be rewritten 
as follows: 
Y,;r = Bx,,  + udr; 
(2)  Y = Y* 
Y = U  if  Y*  2  U (no quota imposed). 
if  Y*  < U (a quota is imposed); 
The quota level, measured by  the value of the latent variable  Y*, is only ob- 
served if a quota is imposed. If no quota is imposed, we interpret the quota as 
having an infinite magnitude, and we model the infinite quota as a quota which 
is censored at an upper limit U. In the estimation, we specify U to be equal to 
the maximum quota level observed during the sample period. We also experi- 
mented with alternative values for U, but these did not affect the results and 
consequently are not reported. The Tobit model with censoring from above can 
be estimated using standard maximum likelihood techniques. 
4.7.3  Data 
The database, which covers the period  198  1-89,27 was created by merging 
information from a number of  different sources. Data on quota levels and im- 
ports at the level of  each MFA category  was collected  by  the International 
Economics Department at the World Bank, based on the Expired Restraints of 
the Performance  Report prepared  by  the U.S. Department  of  Commerce. A 
more detailed description of the World Bank MFA data is provided by Erzan, 
Goto, and Holmes (1990). Information on quota levels is available annually, at 
the level of the individual country exporting to the United States and the indi- 
vidual MFA product category. All quota levels are defined in physical quanti- 
ties, such as dozens of dresses or square yards  of cotton cloth. Rather than 
attempt to use conversion factors which provide crude ways to aggregate across 
different units of measurement,  we used the original quantities. However, to 
avoid nonsensical comparisons between different physical units, we included 
27. This time period was chosen because a previous World Bank project had prepared a database 
on U.S.  quotas that covered those years. The cost of acquiring and cleaning up additional informa- 
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type dummies for each of  the eight different quantity measures included in 
the database.28 
MFA quotas and shipments were merged with Bureau of Labor Statistics 
data on numbers of establishments, wage bill, and total employment. Wages, 
employment, and establishments are recorded annually, at the four-digit Stan- 
dard Industrial Classification (SIC). To merge the two sets of data, we created 
a concordance between  the  SIC and the MFA categories.  Since there  were 
fewer than 100 SIC codes for textiles and apparel (SIC categories 22 and 23) 
but several hundred MFA categories, this required sometimes using the same 
SIC code for several different MFA categories. Real wages were computed by 
dividing the wage bill by the number of employees then deflating by the con- 
sumer price index. 
Information on U.S. production and total U.S. imports, in physical units and 
by MFA category, is collected by  the Textile Division of the U.S. Department 
of  Commerce. The import data aggregates over all imports into the United 
States. Using this data, import penetration was calculated as the share of  im- 
ports in domestic consumption, defined as the sum of  imports and domestic 
production. Although it would have been preferable to subtract U.S. exports in 
calculating import penetration, this information was not available by MFA cat- 
egory. 
The import penetration and production data was directly merged by  MFA 
category with the database on quotas and shipments. Source-country GDP (in 
real levels), GDP growth rates, U.S. total exports to each MFA exporter, and 
exchange rates were all taken from World Bank sources. The exchange rate, in 
dollars per unit of foreign currency, was converted to an index using  198  1 as a 
base year. 
Data on U.S. capital stock for the four-digit SIC categories that include tex- 
tiles and apparel was taken from the NBER trade data file. Details on construc- 
tion of the capital variable is provided by Abowd (1991). Using variables from 
the NBER trade files, we constructed a profits variable  using the following 
definition: 
(3)  Profits = (Value added -  Payroll)/(Value of shipments). 
The profits variable could also be regarded as the capital share in the value 
of output, or the return to capital normalized by the value of output. One prob- 
lem with such a measure is that it is likely to be higher in sectors with greater 
capital intensity. To the extent that the capital stock or some other measure of 
capital intensity is included in the regression,  however, this problem is less 
severe. Other shortcomings of this profit measure, which has been frequently 
used in the empirical industrial organization literature, are discussed in Schma- 
lensee (1986). Since the capital stock variable is only available in the NBER 
28. Physical quantities are reported  in the following different units: dozens, square meters, 
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trade files until  1986, we will present results with and without the capital and 
profit variables. 
There are at least two potentially important sample selection issues which 
arise in assembling this data set. The first is that the database generally ex- 
cludes most industrial countries, with the exception of Japan and Canada. Con- 
sequently, the sample of countries is incomplete. For a complete analysis, we 
would need to include all exporters to the United States, including industrial 
country sources such as Italy. This is an ongoing project for future work. In the 
meantime, however, it is possible that the results are subject to sample selection 
bias. For example, if only the poorer countries are included in the sample, then 
it is likely that the coefficient on real GDP presents inconsistent estimates of 
the relationship between exporter wealth and U.S. protection. 
A second source of  selection bias is the sample’s restriction by data avail- 
ability. In particular,  only those observations are included which have non- 
missing information on wages, employment, U.S. production, and total U.S. 
imports. If  the Department of Commerce is more likely to have nonmissing 
data for products with high import or production volumes, this could also lead 
to selection bias. 
4.7.4  Empirical Results 
Table 4.8 provides an overview of the trends in MFA quota coverage during 
the 1980s. For each country in the database, we computed average quota utili- 
zation for  1981, 1985, and  1989 by  dividing actual  shipments  (in physical 
units) by quota allocations. The fourth column reports the average growth rate 
in quota allocations by country, averaging over all product categories for each 
country. The last column reports the magnitude of U.S. exports to each country 
in 1989. 
In  the first three columns, a missing value indicates that no quotas were 
imposed on the exporting country. It is evident from table 4.8 that the coverage 
of the MFA, in terms of affected countries, increased significantly in the 1980s. 
In  1981, only 22 countries had ceilings imposed on their exports of  textiles 
and  garments; by  1989, the number of quota-constrained  countries-which 
totaled 38 in all-had  nearly doubled. 
The extent to which these quotas were actually binding is the topic of an- 
other paper. However, it is clear from table 4.8 that several major textile export- 
ers attained levels very close to the quota ceiling. On average, China, Taiwan, 
and Hong Kong filled their quotas by over 80 percent across all MFA catego- 
ries. India increased its average utilization rate from 20 percent in 1981 to 73 
percent in 1989; Mexico increased from 26 to 63 percent. 
Despite the significant increase in quota coverage during the  1980s, how- 
ever, quota ceilings were also significantly relaxed. The fourth column in table 
4.8 shows that, on average, import quotas increased by almost 6 percent annu- 
ally.  In  other  words,  although  coverage  increased,  imports  into the  United 
States were also allowed to rise at a moderate rate, as mandated by  the terms Table 4.8  MFA Quotas in the 1980s for the United States: An Overview 
Quota Utilization by 
Year (%)  Growth in Quota  Total U.S. Exports 
Allocation  1989 
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of the MFA. In some cases the increase in quota allocations exceeded 10 per- 
cent per year (such as in China, Malaysia, Dominican Republic, Thailand, Tur- 
key, Indonesia, Uruguay, Bangladesh, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago). The 
combination of increasing quota coverage and increasing access to U.S. mar- 
kets is a key  characteristic  of  the MFA, which has sought to both  increase 
access by developing countries to industrial countries and yet ensure an orderly 
process which would minimize “market disruption” in industrial country mar- 
kets. There are some notable exceptions, however. Quota allocations to two of 
the largest exporters-Taiwan  and Hong Kong-increased  by less than 4 per- 
cent; allocations to Japan actually declined by almost 2 percent annually. 
In  table 4.9,  we compare the means  for wages, employment,  and all the 
other independent variables for the quota-constrained and unconstrained MFA 
categories. Although these comparisons fail to control for other factors, they 
do provide a general indication of  differences in economic conditions across 
protected and unprotected sectors. 
A series of t-tests were used to test the hypothesis that the means are equal 
across protected and unprotected products. A high t-value indicates a rejection 
of  the hypothesis that means are equal across the two groups. Column (3) in 
table 4.9  shows  that  the means are  statistically  different  for wages,  capital 
stock, number of plants, average plant size, import penetration, GDP growth 
in the exporting country, and capitalllabor ratio. 
The results suggest that wages are lower in protected categories, confirming 
the predictions of both theoretical models and anecdotal reports on protection 
in the U.S. textile industry. As pointed out earlier, however, this could simply 
reflect the United States’ greater comparative advantage in high-wage sectors. 
The results also point to a higher number of plants, smaller plant sizes, and 
greater import penetration (in levels) in protected sectors. Using either the cap- 
ital stock or the capital/labor ratio as a measure of  capital intensity, we find 
that no-quota sectors are significantly more capital intensive. Finally, the re- 
sults show that quota-constrained countries exhibit higher GDP growth rates. 
The “Yes-No”  Model 
The logit results from estimating the probability of imposing a quota as a 
function of the x-vector of  independent variables are presented in table 4.10. 
All  specifications include  annual dummies, but the coefficients on the year 
effects are not reported in the table. Since capital and profit variables are only 
available  until  1986, columns (1) and (2) report  the results from excluding 
these two variables, which nearly  doubles the sample size. Columns (3)-(6) 
report the results from using two different measures for capital:  changes in 
capital stock and capital/labor ratio. Each of these three basic specifications is 
reported with and without the inclusion of average plant size. Since plant size 
is defined in terms of two other variables (number of employees divided by 
number of plants) we exclude it from some of the specifications to control for 
potential collinearity problems. 237  The MFA Paradox: More Protection and More Trade? 
Table 4.9  t-Tests of Differences across Protected and Unprotected MFA 
Categories, 1981-89 
Variable 
No Quotas  Quotas  t-Value for r-Test of Means 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Change in U.S.  production 
Change in employment 
Change in import penetration 
Import penetration 






Number of plants 
Plant size 
Change in U.S. exports 
































































Note:  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. All variables except profits, capitaUlabor ratio, 
GDP growth, import penetration (levels and differences), and U.S. production are measured in 
logarithms. All variables except exchange rate, GDP growth, and change in U.S. exports are mea- 
sured at time t- l for a quota imposed in period t. 
*Rejection of  equal means across protected and unprotected categories at the 1 percent level 
The coefficients on the independent variables are generally robust across the 
six different specifications, and the resulting signs and significance levels are 
consistent with our hypothesis that the MFA criteria are significant determi- 
nants of protection, but not the only determinants. As indicated by the stated 
MFA criteria for protection, high levels of import penetration in the previous 
year increase the likelihood of a quota. Likewise, lower levels of net investment 
(change in capital  stock) increase the likelihood  of  protection,  as do lower 
levels of  profits. 
It was a small surprise to find that changes in U.S.  production have no ex- 
planatory power in the regression. The capitaflabor ratio, which we interpret Table 4.10  Logit Model of the Decision to Impose a Quota 
Variable 
Change in U.S. production (-)  0.06 
(.07) 
Change in employment  -  1.49* 
(.35) 
-0.72  Change in import penetration (+) 
Import penetration (t)  0.43* 
(.08) 
Change in capital stock (-) 
~40) 
Profits (-) 
CapitaVlabor ratio (-) 
0.06 
i.07) 















-  1.28* 
i.56) 
0.13 

























(6.33) Exchange rate (-)  -0.03*  -0.03*  -0.08*  -0.08*  -0.08*  -0.08* 
(.01)  (.01)  (W  (.02)  (.02)  (.02) 
Wages (-)  -0.14 
Employment (+)  -0.17* 
(.08) 
Number of plants (-)  0.19* 
(.07) 
Plant size (+)  0.08 





GDP growth in quota country (+)  0.06* 
(.ow 















































Note; Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. All equations include annual time dummies. Constant terms not reported. All variables except profits, capitalflabor 
ratio, GDP growth, import penetration (levels and differences), and U.S. production are measured in logarithms. All variables except exchange rate, GDP growth, and 
change in U.S. exports are measured at time t-  1 for a quota imposed in period r. 
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as an indicator of  U.S. comparative advantage, also is insignificant. We had 
hypothesized that the  higher the capitauabor ratio of  a sector the stronger 
should be U.S. comparative advantage and the lesser the likelihood that the 
sector will experience a degree of import competition sufficient to cause it to 
ask for quota protection. The exchange rate, measuring the dollar cost of the 
exporting country’s currency should have a similar impact, though over time 
rather than across sectors. The exchange rate is significant, but the capitalllabor 
ratio is not. 
The political variables  that are significant reflect both  the equity concern 
and the political  organization models of protection.  Sectors with lower wage 
rates tend more often to be protected, likewise for sectors with relatively large 
plants. Large plant size represents both a barrier to possible entry and a likeli- 
hood that managerial organization is sufficiently large to permit some manage- 
rial resources to be made available for political action. These results suggest 
that textile producers who are numerous and relatively large (in terms of total 
employment) are most effective in lobbying for protection. 
Some of the correlations we found were not expected, for example, a nega- 
tive correlation between the size of the workforce and the probability of protec- 
tion. Perhaps the explanation is that sectors with fewer workers are better able 
to organize and overcome the free-rider problem. The ATMI may also take 
employment into account in making recommendations for protection, perhaps 
interpreting a low level of employment as a sign of  industry problems. This 
interpretation might also account for the negative relationship between em- 
ployment and protection. 
The impact of  international commercial politics is reflected in the negative 
correlation between the likelihood of a quota and the growth of U.S. exports 
to the exporting country. In addition, quotas were more likely to be imposed 
against countries with higher levels of GDP and against countries whose levels 
of imports from the United States were large. These variables both reflect for- 
eign export capacity, and in this sense the signs of the correlations make sense. 
But they are the best indicators we have of  the capacity to retaliate,  so our 
results, taken at face value, indicate that a foreign carrot (rapid growth of im- 
ports from the United States) does influence U.S. decision makers, but a for- 
eign stick (the threat of retaliation) does not. This is at variance with anecdotal 
evidence that suggests that China has been effective in defending its export 
interests by threatening to stop its purchases of U.S. agricultural goods. 
Another possible explanation is that, to the extent that richer countries are 
systematically  excluded from the data sample, the coefficient on the level of 
GDP is upward. Thus, if the sample also included industrial country trade part- 
ners of  the United  States, that is, countries not subject to quota constraints 
under the MFA, we might have found that higher levels of GDP are associated 
with lower protection. If more powerful countries (as measured by the level of 
GDP) are less likely to be the target of U.S. protectionism, then this suggests 
an inverted U-shape between exporter GDP and U.S. protectionism. Very poor 241  The MFA Paradox: More Protection and More Trade? 
countries and very rich countries are less likely to be quota constrained than 
middle-income developing countries.29 
The “Size of  the Quota ’’ Model 
The logit results show the impact of various factors on the probability of a 
quota. The Tobit estimates, presented in table 4.11, examine the impact of these 
same factors on the size of the quota. The extent to which the estimates in table 
4.10 and table 4.11 are consistent will depend on whether the process which 
generates whether  or not to impose a quota also determines the  size of  the 
quota.  Let us assume that the two decisions are generated in the same way. 
Since a larger quota allocation reflects a less restrictive trade policy, then the 
sign on the  coefficients  in  table 4.10 should be reversed  in table 4.11. For 
example, if higher wages were negatively associated with the probability of a 
quota in the logit results, then higher wages should be positively  associated 
with bigger quotas (less restrictive trade policies) in the Tobit estimates. 
The dependent variable in the Tobit estimates in table 4.11 is the logarithm 
of the quota allocation, which is specified in physical units. Product dummies 
are included to account for the fact that not all MFA categories are measured 
in the same units. The coefficients on wages, employment, number of plants, 
plant size, GDP, U.S. exports, and exchange rate-which  are all measured in 
logarithms-can  be interpreted as elasticities. In column (l), a 1 percent in- 
crease in wages leads to a 5.4 percent increase in the level of the quota, which 
indicates looser quotas (i.e., less protection) in products where U.S. workers 
earn higher wages. 
The results from the Tobit specification (“size of quota” model) are consis- 
tent with the logit estimates (“yes-no” model). The same MFA variables and 
political variables are significant in the two specifications, while their signs- 
as hypothesized-are  reversed from one model to the other. The Tobit results 
point to a strong relationship between quota size and the indicators of market 
disruption sanctioned by the MFA. The coefficient on change in employment, 
29. Omitted product- and country-specific effects that are unobserved and remain constant over 
time are a possible source of bias in the estimates presented in table 4.10. In a linear regression 
framework, these unobserved effects could be accounted for by  introducing product and country 
dummies, or by taking deviations from product-country means. In a logit framework, the problem 
is considerably more complicated. However, Chamberlain  (I  980) proposed an approach which 
allows these so-called fixed effects to be taken into account using conventional estimation meth- 
ods. In the two-period case, consistent estimates can be obtained by  only keeping those cases 
where quota coverage switched from 0 to 1 (or vice versa) over time. The resulting pairs of  (0,l) 
and (1.0) observations are then estimated as a function of  the x variables differenced over the 
two periods. 
We applied this approach to the 1983-89  and 1983-86  periods to examine the robustness of our 
original specification. Since the resulting point estimates were either comparable to the results in 
table 4.10 or statistically insignificant, they are not reported here. A large share of the estimates, 
although consistent with table 4.10, were statistically insignificant. One possible reason for this is 
that the cross-section variation in the sample is much greater than the time-series variation, which 
is used to identify the fixed effect model. Table 4.11  Tobit Specification of the Distribution of Quota Allocations across Textile and Garment Exporters to the United States: Dependent 
Variable = log (Quota) 
Change in U.S. production (+)  -0.16 
(.35) 
Change in employment (+)  4.48* 
( 1.74) 
Change in import penetration (-)  2.99 
(1.98) 
Import penetration (-)  -2.13* 
(.44) 
Change in capital stock (+) 
Profits (+) 
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Wages (+)  5.37* 
(  I .07) 
Employment (-)  1.67* 
Number of plants (+)  -1.40 
(.35) 




GDP growth in quota country (-)  -0.24* 
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Nore; Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. All equations include annual time dummies and unit dummies (for type of  quota). Constant terms not reported. All 
variables except profits, capitaVlabor ratio, GDP growth, import penetration (levels and differences), and US.  production are measured in logarithms. All variables 
except exchange rate, GDP growth, and change in U.S.  exports are measured at time r-  1 for a quota imposed in period r. 
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which varies from 4.5 to 8.9, suggests that if the rate of growth of employment 
increased from 0 to 1 percentage point annually, import quotas would expand 
between 4.5 and 8.9 percent. The coefficient on capital stock, which is 11.2, 
implies that if the growth rate of the capital stock were to increase from 0 to 1 
percentage  point  annually,  import  quotas  would  expand  by  11.2 percent. 
A  1 percentage point increase in  import penetration  (which  varies between 
0 and 1) leads to a reduction in import quotas by between  1.8 and 2.1 percent. 
This is a very large effect: if import penetration increased from 0 to 10 percent 
of  domestic consumption, this would imply a contraction in quota levels of 
20 percent. 
The impact of several of the political variables is also significant. A  1 per- 
cent increase in wages leads to a 5 to 9 percent increase in the level of the 
quota. This suggests that the equity concern factor is important-more  protec- 
tion is granted when U.S. workers earn lower wages. 
The size of  the workforce, number  of  plants, and plant size have smaller 
effects. A 1 percent increase in employment leads to between 1.4 and 2.6 per- 
cent increase in the size of  the quota, suggesting a negative relationship be- 
tween size of the workforce and probability of  protection. Higher numbers of 
plants and larger plant sizes are both associated with more restrictive quotas: 
a 1 percent increase in the number of plants decreases the size of the quota by 
1.2 to 2.4 percent. A  1 percent increase in plant size reduces the size of  the 
quota allocation between 0.2 and 1.2 percent. 
Consistent with the earlier results, richer countries and countries with high 
GDP growth rates are subject to more-restrictive  quotas. Countries which in- 
crease GDP growth rates by  1 percentage point can expect a 24 percent con- 
traction in export quotas. As in table 4.10, the results point to a negative rela- 
tionship between the growth in U.S. exports and quota protection. The point 
estimates indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in U.S. exports to an MFA 
exporter leads to an expansion in its quota allocation (on average) of between 
0.1 and 2.4 percent. 
4.7.5  Lessons 
Based on our analysis of the pattern of quota coverage under the MFA dur- 
ing the 1980s, we can draw the following lessons: 
1. The coverage of the MFA expanded significantly during the 1980s. De- 
spite the increased quota coverage,  however, the protection received  by  the 
industry  was porous.  Quota utilization  rates were,  on average, considerably 
below  100 percent. Quota allocations, which grew at slightly below 6 percent 
annually in real terms, grew at an even faster pace for some of the major ex- 
porters, such as China. Although there is strong evidence that increased import 
penetration led to expanded quota coverage and more restrictive quotas, quota 
allocations were also adjusted upward to account for growing import volumes. 
2.  The determinants of protection within the industry are likely to be quite 
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differences can be traced to the political process itself. The power to draw votes 
was an important factor in gathering national support for the passage of  the 
STA, LTA, and MFA. This suggests that the industry’s large share of manufac- 
turing employment in the 1950s and 1960s was a major factor in contributing 
to the industry’s success in winning protection. Within the industry, however, 
it appears that textile and apparel producers who represented a smaller share 
of the labor force-as  proxied by the total number of employees-were  better 
able to win protection. 
3. In general, textile and apparel producers with the following characteris- 
tics were more likely to win protection: fewer employees, more plants, lower 
wages, lower profits, falling investment, higher import penetration, and larger 
plant sizes. 
4. Among countries against which  quotas are imposed, richer countries and 
countries with higher growth rates were more likely to have quota restraints 
imposed on their exports. Since our sample excludes most of the industrial 
countries, the results  suggest that  the richest  developing country  suppliers 
(such as Hong Kong and Taiwan) had almost no negotiating power. Countries 
not included in our sample-the  industrial countries, except Japan-are  absent 
because they are powerful enough to avoid having their exports of textiles and 
clothing subjected to MFA quotas. The countries with enough political power 
to avoid protection were excluded from the sample-the  majority of the indus- 
trial countries. This suggests an inverted-U curve between U.S. protectionism 
and level of exporter GDP: the richest and poorest countries escape protection. 
Among the middle-income developing countries, the most successful exporters 
(measured in terms of  levels or growth rates of  GDP) were punished  with 
higher quotas. 
5. Countries that bought increasing volumes of U.S. exports were also less 
likely to face greater protection. 
4.8  Evaluation 
We are now in a position to evaluate several basic questions relating to the 
1. What range of mechanisms was available to the industry, and why did 
the industry use one or  several of these more effectively than others? 
2.  Was the economic and political organization of the industry a signifi- 
cant factor? 
3. What was the nature of opposition to the industry’s pressure for protec- 
tion, and how did it influence the degree or  form of protection that the indus- 
try received? 
4.  What factors influenced the pattern of quotas across textile and apparel 
products and MFA suppliers? 
protection that the textile industry has received: 
The key to the industry’s political power in the 1950s and 1960s, when it 
gained and institutionalized  a significantly higher degree of protection  than 246  J. Michael Finger and Ann Harrison 
any other industry, was that it was the leading industry in the South, and the 
South enjoyed disproportionate power in the U.S. Congress. In the northern 
states (see Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1972), the textile industry was on the de- 
cline, and although the traditional protectionist stance was maintained, it was 
mostly passive. Despite a few representatives who strongly supported protec- 
tion for textiles, most northern representatives focused on securing funds for 
“regional development” and on attracting diversified industries to the regi~n.~” 
The South drew its power in Congress from the intersection of the seniority 
of  Southern senators and representatives  and the power that seniority enjoyed 
in  the  committee  systems of  the  House  and  Senate.  In  the  87th Congress 
(1961-62),  Southern Democrats held the chairs of  11 of  18 standing commit- 
tees in the Senate and 13 of 2 1 standing committees of the House. Their influ- 
ence over agricultural legislation (which they used to put domestic legal teeth 
into the international textile agreements) was particularly strong. In the House, 
Southern Democrats held the chair of the Agriculture Committee and provided, 
in addition, the eight senior members of the committee. They chaired 12 of 14 
standing subcommittees on agriculture. In the Senate, a Southern Democrat 
chaired the Agriculture Committee, five of six senior members were Southern 
Democrats, and Southern Democrats held the chairs of the four standing sub- 
committees on agriculture.3i Table 4.12 shows that in the 1950s the textile and 
apparel industries accounted for a significant share of  manufacturing jobs in 
all the Southern states-over  half of the manufacturing jobs in several of them. 
The political power of Southern textile interests, combined with a lack of 
opposition from other industries, meant that the executive branch was forced 
to make important  concessions  to the  textile  and apparel  industries. These 
concessions were made in spite of the fact that the executive perceived  for- 
eign policy  interests as best served by  a policy of free trade. By the  1990s, 
however, the balance of power had shifted away from the textile and apparel in- 
terests. 
In  1994, the U.S. government signed the Uruguay Round agreement, which 
provides that all textile and apparel quotas be eliminated within  10 years. Yet 
this  loss by  the industry does not reflect any realization  by  the U.S. voting 
public or even the U.S. government that protecting textile and apparel products 
came at a significant cost to U.S. consumers. Rather, it reflects two unrelated 
factors. First, changes in congressional rules and Southern voting patterns di- 
minished the Southern delegation’s influence. Second, support for US.  textile 
and apparel producers weakened as Asian countries that are major textile ex- 
porters gained importance as markets for U.S. exports. Textile-exporting coun- 
tries such as China are now valued as markets for services and technology- 
30. Bauer et al. (1972, 306) point out that “in  1946, the industry (woolen-worsted industry) 
employed 28000 in Textiletown, but . . . late in  1953, most of  the mills had  moved South, and 
textile employment ran to only 6000 or 7000 persons. Furthermore, at least half  of this employ- 
ment was threatened by the prospect of some of the remaining mills closing.” 
3  1. Tabulated from Congressional Quarterly, Inc. ( 196  1, 1962). 247  The MFA Paradox: More Protection and More Trade? 
Table 4.12  Employment in the Textile and Apparel Industries as a Percentage of 
Total Manufacturing Employment, by State, 1963 

























































Source: US.  Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturing, 1963. Vol. 3, Area Statistics (Wash- 
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), table 6. 
based products. Consequently, the mercantilist interests of the U.S. textile and 
apparel industry were traded for those of other U.S. producers. 
4.8.1  Mechanisms 
The most direct way to achieve protection is to petition for legislative action 
that grants protection-a  tariff increase or a quota voted explicitly by  Con- 
gress. The textile industry had considerable influence in Congress, but Con- 
gress was reluctant to take up directly protectionist legislation. Part of the ex- 
planation for this reluctance was the memory of  the Smoot-Hawley Tariff. 
Another part was the considerable sympathy in Congress for the liberal foreign 
policy view of U.S.  trade policy-a  view that dominated and is most associ- 
ated  with  executive  branch  thinking.  Congress  thus  was  a  willing  co- 
conspirator with the executive in the evolution of a system of indirect and ad- 
ministered protection that infrequently provided protection, though it did pro- 
vide  representatives  and  senators  a  degree  of  political  protection  from 
protection-seeking constituents. And finally, protection voted directly by Con- 
gress would have little chance of avoiding a presidential 
The threat of  legislated protection for the industry was frequently used to 
push executive use of  the authority that the existing trade remedies process 
provided. Beginning as early as the 1950s, the threat of congressional action 
32. A presidential veto might have been avoided by attaching an amendment providing protec- 
tion for the textile industry to a bill the president would not want to lose. But the industry was not 
able to achieve this, e.g., in  1955 losing by  two votes in an attempt to add to the foreign aid bill 
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provided leverage with the Japanese industry and government in the negotia- 
tion of VERs. 
4.8.2  Administered Protection 
The textile industry used the administrative mechanisms that were available, 
filing both escape clause and section 22 (of the AAA) cases. These avenues 
could be used to provide the executive with the authority to restrict imports, 
but they did not mandate that the executive use that authority. Having failed in 
the 1950s to force the executive to use the authority that existing administrative 
protection mechanisms provided, the industry made minimal effort to use its 
influence to have Congress eliminate the discretion these mechanisms allowed 
the executive. That would be a strategy developed later, in the late 1970s and 
the 1980s, and principally by other industries. 
Eventually the industry was successful in forcing the creation of an adminis- 
trative mechanism specifically for its benefit. The mechanism was internation- 
ally sanctioned by the MFA and its predecessor cotton agreements, but its legal 
base was the authority that domestic law gave the president to restrict  U.S. 
imports of textiles and clothing. But, while this special purpose mechanism 
did provide protection for the industry, it did not isolate the determination of 
how much protection from the political  influences that worked against such 
protection. 
4.8.3  Voluntary Export Restraints 
The VER was an instrument that accommodated the various influences that 
came together to shape protection. Pressure for protection from the textile in- 
dustry was, of course, one of these influences, but there were counterpressures 
as well. In the  1930s, after the Smoot-Hawley Tariff was enacted and other 
countries had retaliated, governments were wary of triggering further retalia- 
tion. Negotiation with the exporting country was the usual response to domes- 
tic  pressure  for  increased  protection.  The  success  of  the  reciprocal  trade 
agreements program and the creation under U.S. leadership of the GATT inten- 
sified the U.S. executive’s focus on negotiation  as the way  to establish trade 
policy. Along with these changes came an increased reluctance to limit U.S. 
imports, even through  negotiations.  Under  pressure,  however, the executive 
would turn to the VER. It minimized harm to the “relationship” that existed 
between the United States and the exporting 
33. The qnotation above from George Ball is an example of the routine use of the phrase “the 
relationship” in State Department conceptions of international policy. One of the authors of this 
paper, Finger, remembers interagency discussions in the  1970s over the various proposals for a 
New International Economic Order, e.g., commodity agreements and tariff preferences for devel- 
oping countries, in which State Department arguments stressed that US. support for such propos- 
als was  important to maintaining “the relationship” between the United States and developing 
countries. In  a discussion of the proposed international tin agreement, Finger suggested that the 249  The MFA Paradox: More Protection and More Trade? 
4.8.4  Organization 
The existence of the ATMI certainly facilitated the presentation of the indus- 
try’s  case for protection. But the existence of such an organization was not 
unique to the textile industry, and the tightness of the organization seems more 
likely  the result  of  the means through  which the industry  gained protection 
than an exogenous determinant of that protection. 
Many U.S. industry organizations trace their beginnings to the way in which 
the U.S. government mobilized industry for World War I. Later, the National 
Recovery Act spurred another round of organization, to implement President 
Franklin Roosevelt’s policies to pull the U.S. economy out of the 1930s depres- 
sion. At the same time, the Japanese government had sponsored a reorganiza- 
tion of Japanese industries. Thus industry organizations similar to those that 
existed in the United States and in Japan existed in many industries. 
The ATMI was, in the 1950s, the American Cotton Manufacturers Institute 
(ACMI).  The  particular  association  between  cotton  manufacture  and  the 
strength of the Southern congressional delegation led to the cotton manufactur- 
ers being the first segment of the industry to win protection. Later, the associa- 
tion  of  wool manufacturers was merged  into the ACMI, which became the 
ATMI. The manufacture of products from man-made fibers was developed on 
the whole by companies that began in cotton textile manufacture. 
A feature of the textile industry  that may have contributed to its political 
success was that the industry includes a number of very large companies plus 
a large  number of  relatively  small  ones. The presence  of  large  companies 
meant  that  among them political  organization  was relatively  easy-among 
them, the free-rider problem was minimal. In addition, the large number of 
small companies contributes a large roll of dues-paying members and the basis 
for wide public sympathy. The size distribution  of firms in the industry may 
enable it to take advantage of both the adding machine and the pressure group 
routes to protection. 
4.8.5  Adaptation 
Adaptation to circumstances and to opportunities was an important element 
in the industry’s gaining import protection. The use of VERs as the major in- 
strument, as explained above, was an adaptation rather than an exogenous strat- 
egy of the industry. Likewise, the idea of international negotiations to sanction 
textile agreements was not an explicit strategy of the industry, but when the 
Kennedy administration undertook such negotiations  as the means of provid- 
ing protection that would do the least damage to its foreign policy, the industry 
tin agreement would mean the United States would pay  more for tin and asked for a list of the 
economic benefits the United States might be able to extract from tin-exporting countries through 
the relationship that U.S.  support for the tin agreement would establish. The question was never 
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quietly and skillfully secured passage of legislation that would give the author- 
ity to enforce such agreements to the U.S. government-removing  dependence 
on the exporting country for enforcement. 
Another indication  of  successful adaptation involved the treatment of the 
European Community. The industry in the  1960s wanted  quotas on imports 
from Europe  as well as on imports from Asia.  But  the politics of reaching 
international agreement eventually shifted the U.S. industry to treat European 
producers as allies rather than as competitors. Also, the strongly pro-Europe 
foreign policy position of the U.S. government in the 1960s and 1970s made 
the U.S. executive branch a less than enthusiastic colleague in restraining Euro- 
pean exports. The accommodation that evolved was to leave the tariff on tex- 
tiles relatively high while controlling Asian exports with quotas. The tariff was 
sufficient to provide relief from European producers, whose costs were sig- 
nificantly higher than those of Asian producers. 
4.8.6  Opposition 
Domestic opposition to the industry’s pressure for protection came primarily 
from within the U.S. government-the  executive’s unwillingness to take action 
against imports. The executive could count on support from U.S. heavy indus- 
try  and  from  large  U.S. banks  when  it sought authority to negotiate at the 
GATT to reduce U.S. protection, but U.S. business provided no direct opposi- 
tion to textile industry petitions for protection. The auto industry, for example, 
would support President Kennedy’s TEA but it would not testify at an escape 
clause or section 22 investigation that restrictions on textile exports would in- 
crease its costs and thereby endanger jobs in the auto industry. 
Bauer et al. (1972, 218) note that a reluctance to directly oppose another 
business’ petition for government assistance was a part of U.S. business ethics 
in the  1950s and  1960s. Schattschneider (1935, 144) likewise noted  that in 
testimony before the congressional committees that wrote the Smoot-Hawley 
Tariff, companies  whose  costs  would  be  increased  by  a  tariff  increase  re- 
quested  by  another  company  would  oppose  that  company’s request.  They 
would ask for a compensating increase in their own request. 
The success of the textile industry in securing legislation to implement with 
controls at the U.S. border international agreements such as the LTA  and the 
MFA can be ascribed to the lack of direct opposition to textile industry protec- 
tion. This lack of opposition was due in part to the skill and the power of the 
Southern  congressional  delegation.  Because  this  delegation  controlled  im- 
portant  agricultural  committees,  it  could  use  agricultural  legislation  as  a 
vehicle to pass implementing legislation for the agreements the executive was 
negotiating. For example, in 1962, as the STA was being negotiated, the indus- 
try  gained passage of  an amendment to section 204 of  the Agriculture Act. 
Section 204, before the amendment, gave the president power to negotiate lim- 
its on exports to the United States of agricultural products and of textiles and 
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the president power to limit imports from countries not party to the agreement 
(Curtis and Vastine  1971, 167). Congressman Thomas Curtis, a strong sup- 
porter of the liberal trade program usually identified with the executive, com- 
plained that the amendment had been passed after less than one hour’s debate 
and had been seen before that only by the industry and by the administration 
that was committed to providing protection for the industry, Curtis also pointed 
out that this back-room action took place at the very time Congress was hold- 
ing public hearings on the TEA (Curtis and Vastine 1971, 167). 
Consumer groups in opposition to the textile industry’s protection were not 
active until the 198Os, when the renewals of the MFA became political events. 
Before, consumer groups were weaker and focused primarily on regulation of 
health, safety, and product standards. Furthermore, the AFL-CIO, which was 
opposed to trade liberalization, was an important funding source.34 
While foreign governments were minimally active in opposing creation of 
the STA and the LTA, by the  1970s, when the first MFA was negotiated, they 
became  perhaps  the  major  source of  direct  opposition  to U.S.  textile pro- 
tection. 
4.8.7  MFA Quota Allocations 
Although the coverage of the MFA expanded significantly during the 1980s, 
the protection was leaky. Quota utilization rates were, on average, considerably 
below  100 percent. Quota allocations, which grew at slightly below 6 percent 
annually in real terms, grew at an even faster pace for some of the major ex- 
porters, such as China. Although there is strong evidence that increased import 
penetration led to expanded quota coverage and more restrictive quotas, quota 
allocations were also adjusted upward to account for growing import volumes. 
Domestic politics had a lot to do with how quotas were set. In general, textile 
and apparel producers with the following characteristics were more likely to 
win protection: fewer employees, more plants, lower wages, lower profits, fall- 
ing investment, higher import penetration, and larger plant sizes. 
The MFA and the predecessor international cotton agreements, by establish- 
ing “market disruption” as a legitimate reason for restricting imports, had the 
effect of sanctioning such domestic considerations, but, of course, only for the 
textile and apparel industries. 
We also found that while the MFA effectively legitimized market disruption 
as a reason for protection, it did not succeed in isolating market disruption as 
the only determinant. Other influences have a role in quota determination, and 
some of these influences-particularly  international political influences-tend 
toward looser restrictions. Countries that increased their demand for total U.S. 
exports are rewarded with larger quotas. Furthermore, the industrial countries 
(except Japan) avoided the U.S. MFA, but poorer developing countries are less 
likely to have quota restraints imposed on their exports than richer ones. This 
34. From conversations with textile industry association officials. 252  J. Michael Finger and Ann Harrison 
suggests an inverted-U curve between U.S. protectionism and level of exporter 
GDP: the richest and poorest countries escape protection. Among the middle- 
income developing countries, the most successful exporters (measured in terms 
of levels or growth rates of GDP) were punished with higher quotas. 
4.8.8  Summing Up 
All told, the major factors underlying the success of  the textile industry in 
winning protection were: (1) the political power of  the industry, based on its 
close association with the Southern congressional delegation; (2) the relatively 
weak influence over U.S. policy of  the Asian countries against which export 
restraints were directed; and (3) the success of  the industry  in adjusting  its 
demands on the form of protection that it wanted to the possibilities allowed 
by the international politics of the day. 
Appendix 
Table 4A.1  Statistics for the Textile and Apparel Industries, 1960-85 
Import  Export 
Employment  Value of Output  Penetration  Share  Relative  Unionization 



















































3.4  0.65  0.18  17.3 
2.6  0.67  0.19  17.5 
2.4  0.71  0.19  17.5 
4.9  0.66  0.18  17.4 
6.9  0.66  0.21  15.4 
3.6  0.64  0.20  - 
1.3  0.56  0.17  36.5 
1.0  0.56  0.20  36.5 
1.0  0.57  0.23  36.4 
1.9  0.54  0.23  35.6 
3.5  0.50  0.26  31.5 
1.8  0.50  0.27  - 
'Relative  wages are defined as average wages in the sector divided by  average wages in the rest 
of manufacturing. 
"Profits  defined as (value-added-remuneration to labor)/value of shipments. 
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Comment  Robert E. Baldwin 
It is a pleasure to read a paper that presents a general survey of how protection 
in the textile and apparel sectors has evolved over time. There have been nu- 
merous papers analyzing particular  aspects of protection  in these sectors or 
particular periods of protection, but few with as broad a historical perspective 
as this one. 
A major task of any paper on textile and apparel protection is to explain how 
and why these  sectors have obtained  such high levels of  protection. As the 
authors’ data indicate, in the  1950s and the 1960s when quantitative import 
restrictions in these sectors became significant, the level of import penetration 
in textiles  was only around 6 percent and in apparel  only about 3 percent. 
How does one explain why many other industries with much higher import 
penetration levels did not also receive significant protection at this time? 
One explanation offered by the authors is that senators and representatives 
from southern states enjoyed special influence in Congress because of their 
long tenure  and the practice  of  choosing committee chairs on the basis  of 
seniority. Most would agree that this must have been an important part of the 
explanation.  However, one should ask why the increased protection  did not 
come earlier, since members from southern states had this special power long 
before the 1950s and 1960s. One should also consider whether the decline in 
the power of  southern members of Congress as a result of  congressional re- 
forms in the 1970s and 1980s made it more difficult for the textile and apparel 
sectors to gain protection. 
Wasn’t one of the factors accounting for textile and apparel protection in the 
1950s and 1960s the significant rise in textile and apparel employment in the 
South during these years as these industries moved out of New England? The 
resulting increase in the size of the bloc of votes represented by these industries 
then made it worthwhile for southern legislators to exercise their special con- 
gressional power. 
Another point made by the authors is that the executive branch treated trade 
policy as foreign policy during this period and, therefore, was reluctant to grant 
import protection for fear of undermining its foreign policy goals. In my view, 
this is a key factor not only in explaining the difficulty in gaining protection in 
the 1940s and 1950s, but in explaining why it became much easier for indus- 
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tries to receive protection in the  1960s and later. By the  1960s, Europe and 
Japan had restored production to their prewar levels, and there was less force 
to the argument that we needed a liberal trade policy to help other countries 
become economically strong in order to resist Communist expansion. Conse- 
quently, the foreign policy  implications of  trade policy  were much less im- 
portant for the United States by the 1960s. 
In analyzing protection in the textile and apparel sectors, the authors men- 
tion, but do not discuss, that the quotas established under the Multi-Fiber Ar- 
rangement will be phased out over a 10-year period under the Uruguay Round 
agreements. How do we explain this significant shift in policy in view of the 
fact that, as they point out, tough  quotas were imposed  in these  sectors as 
late as 1986? It would be helpful, incidentally, if the authors presented a table 
indicating just how average levels of protection changed in textiles and apparel 
over recent years. 
Picking up on a theme that the authors stress in the early part of their paper, 
one factor that may help account for the Uruguay Round agreement in textiles 
and apparel is the shift in the economic power of the developing countries. As 
the authors point out, the political and economic weakness of these nations in 
the  1960s and  1970s helps explain the high levels of  protection imposed in 
these years. However, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, international power 
relationships had changed significantly. In response to the rapidly expanding 
market opportunities in the developing countries, the United States and other 
developed countries established as major Uruguay Round negotiating objec- 
tives the opening of developing country markets for services, the elimination 
of their trade-related investment measures, and the strengthening of their en- 
forcement of intellectual property  rights.  Since the developing  countries be- 
lieved (rightly in my view) that responding favorably to these negotiating goals 
would lead to severe adjustment problems, they insisted on balancing conces- 
sions from the developed countries. In particular, they pressed for liberaliza- 
tion in the textile and apparel sectors since they clearly have a comparative 
advantage in producing these products. Thus, it seems likely that negotiators 
from the United States and other developed countries were willing to accept 
liberalization in the textile and apparel sectors in exchange for acceptance by 
the developing countries of liberalization of  their services trade, elimination 
of  trade-related investment measures, and stricter enforcement of intellectual 
property rights. 
Next let me turn to the empirical analysis in the Finger-Harrison paper. One 
very interesting point they make is that a private trade association, the Ameri- 
can Textile Manufacturers  Institute, plays a major role in allocating quotas 
across countries and across products. Indeed, they found evidence that most of 
the  industry’s recommendations  are accepted by  the  government  committee 
making the final decisions. This suggests that they may want to consider how 
a political  economy model in which a private  industry  makes the decisions 
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I suspect that notions of fairness and equity play an even greater role in such 
a model than in a political economy model in which the government makes the 
trade policy decisions. They do, in fact, find that these concepts seem to be 
important in decisions on textile and apparel protection. For example, they find 
that quotas are more likely in textile and apparel product lines in which wages 
are low, import penetration levels are high, production is very labor intensive, 
and the size of  plants is small. All of  these factors can be interpreted as re- 
flecting fairness and equity concerns. Incidentally, in all of this analysis, I think 
it is important to separate textiles and apparel. They are quite different in terms 
of such factors as labor intensiveness, skill levels, and size of plant. 
One regression  result that is somewhat puzzling to the authors is the in- 
creased likelihood  of  quotas being imposed the higher a country’s GDP and 
the greater its exports to the United States. A bargaining power view of  the 
political economy  process would  lead one to expect a negative  correlation. 
However, causality runs in both directions between these variables. Countries 
such  as Hong  Kong  and Taiwan were  able to achieve high levels  of  GDP 
through  high exports of textiles and  apparel. In the process of raising their 
income levels through outward-looking policies, the textile and apparel mar- 
kets of developed countries were disrupted, and their governments  imposed 
quantitative import controls on textiles and apparel. So perhaps it is not surpris- 
ing to observe a positive association between high GDP levels and highly re- 
strictive quotas. 
Comment  I. M. Destler 
I find the Finger-Harrison analysis basically on the mark: 
In its rich political history, though this fades away sometime in the Johnson 
In its characterization of the outcome-comprehensive  but leaky protection; 
In its characterization of the form of textile protection-nonstatutory  VERs, 
with  Congress  not  even  ratifying  the  multilateral  and  bilateral  textile 
agreements; 
In its conclusions about the structure of interests that brought about this level 
of  protection-a  concentration of  a few large companies that are natural 
leaders with a large number of small firms that are natural followers. 
I would extend this characterization to the congressional support for textile 
protection as well: concentration in the Carolinas and Georgia, from which 
leadership typically  comes (Strom Thurmond,  Ernest Hollings, and Ed Jen- 
kins),  with  smaller firms  scattered in  New York, California,  and numerous 
administration; 
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other  states, resulting  in  numerous  legislators whose constituencies  incline 
them toward support. 
There are at least two anomalies that the authors do not address: 
Their basic argument attributes textile protection to the structure of the in- 
dustry and its congressional power base, but its two big breakthroughs-the 
LTA  and the MFA-followed  directly from successes in presidential poli- 
tics, from winning promises from John F.  Kennedy in 1960 and Richard M. 
Nixon in 1968. 
The main protection was achieved before the big import surge of the 1980s, 
and the industry was unable to win major new increments in protection in 
the wake of that surge. So in addition to the intersectoral comparisons sug- 
gested by Robert Baldwin and Jagdish Bhagwati, an intertemporal compari- 
son would be useful. 
My  major problem with the paper, however, is that the two parts do not 
really mesh. The historical analysis stops in the late 1960s, at least  12 years 
before the period of the quantitative analysis of specific quotas and levels. Thus 
the paper omits a lot that is important for its own sake and that could inform 
the hypothesis testing. 
It omits the Nixon interlude in textile policy, which was the polar opposite 
of the nuanced, foreign policy sensitive, balanced effort under Kennedy. ’ Ini- 
tially in charge was not the multifaceted George Ball but the monotonic (if not 
monomaniacal) Maurice Stans. Low politics came to dominate high politics, 
as the return of Okinawa to Japan was conditioned on Prime Minister Eisaku 
Sat0 pledging a textile quota agreement. When he proved unable to deliver, 
this precipitated arguably the most serious crisis in U.S.-Japan relations from 
World War  I1 to the present,  and it brought Congress closer to enactment of 
broad statutory protection than it has come from Smoot-Hawley to the present. 
The paper also misses the statutory politics of 1985-90, with Congress pass- 
ing (and Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush vetoing) no less than 
three separate quota bills that the House then failed to override by margins of 
8, 11, and 10 votes, respectively. In missing this, it also misses the modest but 
relevant impact of the apparel retailers, who mobilized against this legislation. 
Another development since the  1960s has been the growing divergence in 
the experiences of the textile and the apparel producers, with the former prov- 
ing much the more competitive. With this divergence of experience came di- 
vergence in their political positions, with the textile mill interests represented 
by the American Textile Manufacturers Institute (ATMI) (always the political 
heart of the coalition) increasingly acting in ways that do not serve their apparel 
brethren. The “triple transformation” test which they extracted on NAFTA is a 
case in point:  it makes sure that any clothing imported from Mexico under 
NAFTA contains North American fiber and cloth, but it leaves apparel firms 
competing head to head with Mexican counterparts. The ATMI posture on the 
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is similar, seeking to trade off removal 
of  textile import bamers in Third World countries  for its reluctant acquies- 
cence to phase-out of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA). 
And finally, the Finger-Harrison paper does not complete the story of what 
became the basic formula for industry success and does not discuss its (still 
puzzling to me) departure from this formula after 1985. 
The basic approach, which the paper describes in its treatment of the 1950s 
and 1960s, was to eschew serious efforts at achieving statutory protection but 
threaten to block broader trade liberalization measures unless the demands of 
the textile industry were met by other means. The reigning administration was 
thus invited to buy the industry’s silence, and sometimes even support, on ma- 
jor new multilateral trade rounds. 
This was done in the Kennedy Round, as the paper nicely documents, where 
the Short Term ArrangementLong Term Arrangement initiated in 1961 cleared 
the way for the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. 
This  was  done  under  Nixon  and  Gerald  Ford,  when  the  multifiber 
agreements with Japan and the East Asian newly industrialized  countries in 
1971 and the MFA of  1973 put the textile issue aside again, allowing passage 
of the Trade Act of 1974. 
The same device was sprung, suddenly, on Jimmy Carter and Robert Strauss 
in the fall of  1978, when the textile industry blocked completion of the Tokyo 
Round by getting the Senate-and  then the House-to  pass bills retracting all 
U.S. concessions on textile tariffs. This forced Strauss to negotiate new protec- 
tion for the industry-in  this case a tightening of current quota arrangements 
with major East Asian suppliers. 
A slightly different variant arose in 1983, when the textile industry threat- 
ened broad US.-China trade relations by submitting a countervailing duty case 
attacking  China’s dual  exchange  rate  system  as  a  countervailable  subsidy. 
Rather than risk a possibly disruptive outcome by allowing the case to run its 
course, the Reagan administration struck a deal: it tightened the screws a bit 
more on East Asian suppliers, and the ATMI withdrew its suit. 
This strategy made possible a mixed, not especially friendly, but positive- 
sum relationship between industry leaders and administration trade liberaliz- 
ers. The latter always felt that the industry demanded too much and got too 
much but that nevertheless bargains could be struck and the liberalizers’ top 
priority could proceed. The question, then, is why the industry abandoned this 
strategy in the latter part of the 1980s, pursuing instead the will-o’-the-wisp of 
statutory textile quotas. 
When the “Jenkins Bill” mandating global, statutory quotas was introduced 
in the spring of 1985, it seemed to some a continuation of the old strategy. And 
in fact, after President  Reagan  vetoed  the bill  that  fall, industry  supporters 
cleverly  got the override vote postponed  until summer 1986, so the “threat” 
would press the administration to toughen its stance in the MFA renewal nego- 
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ride vote (eight votes short of the two-thirds required), and perhaps encouraged 
by several Democratic victories when the industry targeted Republican Senate 
and House candidates in the southeastern  states that November, the industry 
made quota legislation its overriding objective. 
There was  comprehensive  trade  legislation  coming down the  track  once 
again in 1987 and 1988. But this time the industry did not seek to block such 
legislation, or to use the threat of blockage to bargain for new special protec- 
tion. Indeed, all it asked of congressional leaders was that they promise House 
and  Senate votes  on  the  Jenkins  Bill  after  the  omnibus  legislation  went 
through! It was already fall  1988 when the Senate completed action, and the 
operative question  among Democrats  was not  whether the bill could be en- 
acted, but whether to let it die in conference (as Ways and Means Chairman 
Dan Rostenkowski wanted) or to force the president to veto it so that Demo- 
crats could use that  fact against Republicans  in November. Then, after that 
House override vote predictably  failed, the industry pushed the bill through 
Congress a third time in 1990, with virtually identical results. An industry once 
astute at using Congress to gain its ends was now being used by Congress, as 
members were free to cast symbolic votes for textile protection that they knew 
(happily, in many cases) would have no impact. 
Why? The best reason this observer has heard is that the ATMI staff in Wash- 
ington-which  understood the political game rather well-was  overruled by 
stubborn and willful mill executives, Roger Milliken in particular. This would 
be an all-too-human explanation of why, in an environment exceptionally fa- 
vorable for protectionist  action, the textile industry failed to deploy the sub- 
stantial congressional forces it had as leverage for a negotiated outcome. 
An alternative explanation might be that this was an industry past its politi- 
cal prime, which sensed that and decided to make one last roll of the dice-in 
fact, three last rolls-to  try to lock in a stronger, statutory regime of protection 
before its reduced power became evident in the broader trade community. In 
any  case,  the industry  was  less  effective in  securing  new  protection  in the 
1980s, when import growth was fiercest, than it had been in the  1960s and 
1970s. A current sign of  its limited power-and  of the textile-apparel split- 
is the fact that the industry did not mount a strong campaign against congres- 
sional approval of the Uruguay  Round agreements phasing out the MFA. So 
steel may not be the only large U.S.  industry whose political capacity to obtain 
protection has waned, 
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